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Abstract. New Keynesian dynamic stochastic general equilibrium models are the
principal paradigm currently employed for central bank policymaking. In this paper, we
construct experimental economies, populated with human subjects, with the structure of
a New Keynesian DSGE model. We give individuals monetary incentives to maximize the
objective functions in the model, but allow scope for agents￿boundedly rational behavior and
expectations to in￿ uence outcomes. Subjects participate in the roles of consumer/workers,
producers, or central bankers. Our objective is twofold. The ￿rst objective is general,
and is to create an experimental environment for the analysis of macroeconomic policy
questions. The second objective is more focused and is to consider several speci￿c research
questions relating to the persistence of shocks, the behavior of human central bankers, and
the pricing behavior of ￿rms, using our methodology. We ￿nd that the presence of menu
costs is not necessary to generate persistence of output shocks, but rather that monopolistic
competition in the output market is su¢ cient. Interest rate policies of human discretionary
central bankers are characterized by persistence in interest rate shocks, the use of the Taylor
principle, and lower output and welfare than under an automated instrumental rule. Pattens
in price changes conform closely to stylized empirical facts.
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Introduction
New Keynesian dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) models (see Clarida, Gal￿, and
Gertler, 1999) are the principal paradigm currently employed for central bank policymaking.
The popularity of these models lies in the rich and plausible dynamics they are able to generate,
and their ability to allow policymakers to study the consequences of shocks, whether exogenous
and policy-induced. Inclusion of wage or price stickiness generates short-term real e⁄ects (see,
e.g., Christiano et al., 1999, 2004, 2005, and Chari, Kehoe, and Mcgrattan, 2000), and thus
a meaningful and potentially bene￿cial role for central bank policy. With the appropriate
speci￿cation of price frictions, important stylized empirical facts can be replicated (see e.g.,
Rotemberg and Woodford, 1997; Clarida, Gal￿, and Gertler, 1999; Christiano, Eichenbaum,
and Evans, 2005; Smets and Wouters, 2007). A common method of introducing a price friction
is to assume a menu cost (Calvo, 1983; Rotemberg, 1982, Barro, 1972, Mankiw, 1985 and
Ball and Mankiw, 1995), a cost that a ￿rm must pay to change its price, in conjunction with
monopolistic competition in the output market. The monopolistic competition ensures that
￿rms earn pro￿ts, and thus that they have some discretion in the timing and magnitude of
changes in the prices they set. These assumptions allow the DSGE model to conform to empirical
data, while maintaining the classical assumptions of representative households and ￿rms who
optimize and have rational expectations.
In this paper, we construct experimental economies, populated with human subjects, with
the structure of a New Keynesian DSGE model. The experimental economies conform closely
to the structure of the nonlinear version of the model, but make no assumptions on agents￿
behavior. Instead, we give individuals monetary incentives to maximize the objective functions
of the model, but allow scope for agents￿ boundedly rational behavior and expectations to
in￿ uence outcomes. Our objective in this research is twofold. The ￿rst objective is general:
it is to create an experimental environment in which macroeconomic policy questions can be
studied, to serve as a complementary tool to the methods currently employed. The second,
more focused, objective of this study is to consider some speci￿c research questions within our
environment.
Stylized facts from empirical studies motivate the speci￿c questions we consider. A ￿rst set
of issues considers how two types of frictions in￿ uence the persistence of shocks (Chari, Kehoe,
and Mcgrattan, 2000; Jeanne, 1998). The frictions are (1) the presence of monopolistic rather
than perfect competition, and (2) the existence of menu costs, in the output market. Speci￿cally,
we study whether a number of empirical stylized facts can be replicated in our experimental
economies. Empirical vector autoregression (VAR) studies show that policy innovations typi-
cally generate an inertial response in in￿ ation and a persistent, hump-shaped response in output
after a policy shock (see, e.g., Christiano, Eichenbaum, and Evans, 1997; Leeper, Sims, Zha,
Hall, and Bernanke, 1996). Moreover, hump-shaped responses in consumption, employment,
pro￿ts, and productivity, as well as a limited response in the real wage, are robust ￿ndings. To
match the empirical (conditional) moments of the data, as derived by structural VAR, nominal
and real rigidities must be introduced. One way this has been done is through monopolisticFrictions, persistence, and central bank policy in an experimental DSGE 3
competition and menu costs in the output market. Three of our experimental treatments isolate
these speci￿c rigidities in our economy. Our Baseline treatment di⁄ers from another treatment,
Menu Cost, only in that in the latter, menu costs are present. Thus we can isolate the e⁄ect
of menu costs on shock persistence, while holding all else equal. The Baseline and the Low
Friction treatments di⁄er from each other only in that the output market is monopolistically
competitive under Baseline and perfectly competitive under Low Friction. This allows us to
study the e⁄ect of monopolistic competition, holding all else equal. Our treatments allow us to
consider, within our setting, whether both frictions produce more persistence than an identical
economy in which the menu cost is absent, and than an economy in which both menu costs and
monopolistic competition are absent. The experiment permits an additional potential source
of friction and ine¢ ciency, bounded rationality. The possibility exists that behavioral factors
alone may cause slow market adjustment, and may be su¢ cient on their own to generate shock
persistence and produce the stylized facts mentioned above.
A second set of issues considers the decision rules that human discretionary central bankers
employ. The Taylor principle (Bullard and Mitra, 2002; Woodford, 2003c), a coe¢ cient of re-
sponsiveness of interest rates to in￿ ation of greater than one, has been widely advocated (Taylor,
1993, Rotemberg and Woodford, 1997, Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe, 2005). In the three treatments
mentioned previously, the interest rate policy in the economy is exogenously imposed by the
experimenter, following an instrumental in￿ ation-targeting rule obeying the Taylor principle.
However, in a fourth treatment, Human Central Banker, experimental subjects are placed in
the role of central bankers. They are given incentives to target in￿ ation but are free to set
the interest rate in each period. While the Taylor principle is e⁄ective in targeting in￿ ation
when economic agents are fully rational, it is unknown whether it would have the same e⁄ect in
our economy. In our experiment, we consider two issues. The ￿rst is whether the interest rate
policy of our subjects actually satis￿es the Taylor principle. It may fail to do so for a number
of reasons: because such a rule is not optimal in our economy, because it is not transparent to
subjects, or because subjects prefer to apply another rule. The second issue is whether human
central bankers are able to match or exceed the levels of GDP, welfare and employment, or to
achieve more stability in in￿ ation, than a simple, plausible, but suboptimal instrumental Taylor
rule.
The third set of issues we investigate concerns the patterns in pricing behavior of ￿rms. We
consider how well the experimental data conform to a number of accepted empirical stylized
facts. We compare pricing patterns in our data to those described in Nakamura and Steinsson
(2008), Bils and Klenow (2004), and Klenow and Malin (2010) appear in our economies. We
measure the average frequency and magnitude of price changes and how they correlate with
overall in￿ ation. We evaluate whether positive changes are more frequent than negative ones
and by what percentage. We check whether the frequency of price increases covaries strongly
with in￿ ation, whereas the frequency and size of price decreases, as well as the size of price
increases, do not. We consider whether the hazard rate of price changes is increasing over time,
or decreasing, as has been often observed in empirical data. We estimate the markup that
producers charge, and check whether it decreases over time as in other experimental studies4 C. N. Noussair, D. Pfajfar and J. Zsiros
(Noussair et al., 1995, 2007). We also consider whether these patterns di⁄er between treatments,
and thus whether they are dependent on the presence of monopolistic competition or menu costs.
The experimental design, which is described in section two, employs many techniques devel-
oped and used in previous experiments that other authors have conducted. Our subjects interact
in both double auction markets (Smith, 1962) and posted o⁄er markets (Plott and Smith, 1978;
Ketcham, Smith, and Williams, 1984). Simultaneous input and output markets are operating,
as in Goodfellow and Plott (1990), Noussair et al. (1995, 2007), Lian and Plott (1998), and Riedl
and van Winden (2001). Saving possibilities create interdependencies between one period and
the next, in a manner similar to Lei and Noussair (2002, 2007) and Capra, Tanaka, Camerer,
Feiler, Sovero, and Noussair (2009). The incentives of our discretionary central bankers are
similar to those studied by Engle-Warnick and Turdaliev (2010) and Roos and Luhan (2010).
We implement menu costs in a manner similar to Wilson (1998). However, since we are guided
by the structure of the New Keynesian DSGE model, we have added, when necessary, a number
of new features to the economy. The structure of the economies is described in section one.
Our ￿ndings are presented in section three. We ￿nd that monopolistic competition generates
persistence of output shocks, whether or not menu costs are present. The presence of monop-
olistic competition, however, is critical; there is no persistence of output shocks under perfect
competition. Humans in the role of central banker generate considerably greater persistence,
lower output, and lower welfare than a simple automated instrumental Taylor rule. Overall,
pricing patterns conform to empirical stylized facts. Most price changes are positive, in￿ ation is
correlated with average magnitude of both price increases and decreases, and with the number
of positive, but not negative, price changes. Menu costs reduce the variability of in￿ ation. We
do ￿nd, however, that the hazard function for price changes is upward-sloping, in contrast to
most empirical studies.
We view the use of experiments as complementary to other empirical methods used in macro-
economics. Experimental economics allow researchers create real, though synthetic, economies
expressly designed to answer speci￿c research questions. The structure of the economy is allowed
to interact with the boundedly rational decisions of human agents to produce macroeconomic
activity. However, many of the advantages of calibration exercises are preserved. Parameters
such as production and cost functions, the timing and variance of shocks, and the number of
producers and consumers, can be manipulated exogenously. Thus the structure of the economy
can conform to the model under investigation, causality can be imposed to distinguish between
competing explanations for events or empirical patterns, and variables otherwise unobservable
can be observed and precisely measured. Replication of an experiment is possible with multiple
groups of randomly assigned subjects. Thus one can create many economies with the same un-
derlying structure. This allows multiple observations to be gathered to enable proper statistical
tests, and to allow the potential variability of outcomes to be studied. Furthermore, because
subjects from the same population can be assigned to di⁄erent experimental treatments, and the
environment can be controlled, an experiment can be designed so that one or more institutional
or environmental elements can be varied, ceteris paribus.Frictions, persistence, and central bank policy in an experimental DSGE 5
1. Experimental Design
This section is organized as follows. Subsection 1.1 presents the structure of the DSGE model
that provides the basis for the experimental design, while subsection 1.2 describes the ver-
sion implemented in the laboratory. Subsections 1.3 and 1.4 describe the di⁄erences between
treatments and key aspects of the operational procedures, respectively.
1.1. The DSGE model. The dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) model is
the workhorse of modern macroeconomic research and policy.1 In the model, there are three
types of agent: households, ￿rms, and a central bank, who interact over an in￿nite horizon.
Households choose labor supply, consumption, and savings, to maximize the discounted present
value of the utility of consumption and leisure. Firms choose the quantity of labor to employ,
and output to produce, to maximize the discounted present value of pro￿ts. The central bank
sets the nominal interest rate to maximize a speci￿c function of in￿ ation and output.
Speci￿cally, in each period, the representative consumer works, consumes, and decides on
a saving level at each time t in order to maximize her expected discounted value of utility of
















subject to the following budget constraint











; # > 1: (3)
# is the Dixit-Stiglitz aggregator, Pt is the corresponding price index, Ct is consumption, Lt
is labor supplied, Bt denotes savings, Wt is the market wage, ￿ is the intertemporal discount
factor, and ￿t is the total pro￿t of ￿rms at t.
Firms have a stochastic production technology gjt(Njt) = ZtNjt; with E(Zt) = 1. The ￿rms￿







where Njt is the labor hired by the ￿rm j, and cjt is the ￿rm￿ s level of production of the good
that it produces.2
1For a detailed discussion of the model, see the books by Walsh (2003) and Woodford (2003a)
2This optimization problem could be reformulated in terms of pro￿t maximization, where the objective of the
￿rm is to maximize pro￿t in each period.6 C. N. Noussair, D. Pfajfar and J. Zsiros
There is perfect competition in the labor market, and monopolistic competition (Dixit and
Stiglitz, 1977) on the output market. The market power for producers in the output market is
represented in the Dixit-Stiglitz aggregator and denoted by # in equation (3).
The nominal interest rate in the economy (see, for example, Woodford, 2003a) is set to
minimize the following loss function
minL = (￿t ￿ ￿￿)2 + ￿(xt ￿ x￿
t)2; (5)
where ￿t is actual in￿ ation, ￿￿ is the in￿ ation target, xt ￿ x￿ is the output gap, and ￿ is a
parameter that indicates the relative weight of in￿ ation and output in policy determination.
1.2. Experimental Implementation. The actual model implemented in the laboratory
was a modi￿cation of the DSGE model described above. The changes we made were guided
exclusively by concerns about what was feasible given the cognitive demands that could be
imposed on the subjects and the resources we had available.3 The experiment was computerized
and used the Z-Tree platform Fischbacher (2007). We describe here the Baseline treatment. In
subsection 1.3, we indicate the di⁄erences between the Baseline and the other three treatments.4
Consumers. There were I = 3 consumers and J = 3 ￿rms indexed by i and j respectively.
In the experiment each consumer was endowed with an induced valuation (Smith, 1982) for the
following objective function: 5




















where cijt is the consumption of the ith consumer of good j and Lit is the labor i supplies at
time t. Hij denotes the preference (taste) shock, which is speci￿c to each consumer and good
in each period, and follows the process:
Hijt = ￿ij + ￿Hijt￿1 + "jt: (7)
Here, "1t; "2t; "3t are independent white noise processes, and "jt ￿ N(0;￿). As is standard in
the DSGE literature, the preference shocks follow an AR(1) process.
Consumers faced the budget constraint
3 X
j=1




3The standard DSGE model has no explicit timing within each period. However the implementation in the
laboratory requires that some decisions be taken before others.
4Subjects were all undergraduate students at Tilburg University. Four sessions were conducted under each
treatment. Six subjects participated in each session, with the exception of sessions of the Human Central Banker
treatment, in which there were 9 participants. Average ￿nal earnings to participants were 43:99 euros. No subject
participated in more than one session. Only one treatment was in e⁄ect in any session.
5Discounting was implemented by reducing the induced value of consumption of each of the output goods, as
well the utility cost of labor supply, by 1 ￿ ￿ = 1% in each period.Frictions, persistence, and central bank policy in an experimental DSGE 7
where cijt is the consumption of subject i of good j at time t, pjt is the price of good j at time
t, wit is the wage of subject i at time t, Bit is the saving of subject i at period t , ￿t￿1 is the
total pro￿t of ￿rms in period t￿1 and I = 3 indicates the number of consumers in the economy.
￿t￿1 appears in the budget constraint, in accordance with the DSGE model assumption that
the households own the ￿rms. Therefore, at the end of each period in the experiment, the total
pro￿ts of ￿rms are transferred to and divided equally among the three consumers.
Producers. In each period t, the payo⁄ of ￿rm j was given by:




where pjt is the price, yjt is the number of goods sold, wjt is the wage payed, and Ljt the labor
applied by ￿rm j in period t. Pt is the price level in period t, while P0 is the price level in the
initial period. Therefore, P0
Pt is a de￿ ator that translates nominal pro￿ts into real terms. Firms
were given incentives to maximize real pro￿ts.
All ￿rms were endowed with the same production technology, given by:
fjt(Ljt) = AtLjt; (10)
where At is a technology shock, which was common to all ￿rms. It had the functional form
At = A + ￿At￿1 + &t; (11)
where &t is independent white noise &t ￿ N(0;￿). At follows an AR(1) process as is standard in
the DSGE literature. In each period, each ￿rm j chose how much labor to employ, Ljt, and its
product price pjt.
Labor market. The standard DSGE model assumes perfect competition on the labor
market. This was implemented with a continuous double auction trading mechanism (Smith,
1962; Plott and Gray, 1990), where consumers and producers can exchange labor. The market
was open for a ￿xed period of time, during which agents could submit o⁄ers to purchase and sell
units. O⁄ers were posted publicly. At any time, any trader could accept a quote submitted by
an individual on the other side of the market. Trade in both the labor and the output markets
took place in terms of experimental currency, called ECU.
Output market. On the product market, the three di⁄erent goods were imperfect sub-
stitutes due to the product speci￿c Hijt taste shocks of consumers. This ensured that each ￿rm
had some monopoly power in the market, as in the monopolistic competition assumed in the
DSGE model. The market was organized as a posted o⁄er market. Each producer sold her
product in a separate market, and the three markets operated simultaneously. Producers set
prices before observing the prices of their competitors. After prices were set, consumers could
purchase the products on a ￿rst-come ￿rst-served basis. Products were consumed immediately
upon purchase. Producers were required to bring their entire production to market. Unsold8 C. N. Noussair, D. Pfajfar and J. Zsiros
units could not be carried over to the next period.
Monetary policy. The nominal interest rate was exogenously set according to the Taylor
rule,
it = ￿￿ + ￿(￿t￿1 ￿ ￿￿); (12)
where the parameters were set to ￿ = 1:5 and ￿￿ = 3%.
Parameters. Table 1 contains a summary of parameter values used in the experiment.
The parameters of the model are taken from empirical estimates when possible, with each period
t corresponding to one quarter in the ￿eld. Exactly the same parameters were in e⁄ect in all
treatments, except for the preference shock process in the low friction treatment (see Appendix
A1)
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ A ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿









Each consumer was endowed with 1500 ECU of cash at the beginning of period 1 that
could be used for purchases. In each period, each consumer was endowed with 10 units of
labor. Producers had no initial endowment of labor or cash. However, they could borrow at
the beginning of a period (interest free) in order to purchase labor, and thus were not cash-
constrained. Unsold products were disposed of after the end of each period.
Timing within a period. The experiment was divided into a sequence of periods. Each
period corresponded to a time period t in the DSGE model. At the beginning of each period,
producers observed the realization of their own productivity shock for the period. The labor
market was then opened and operated for 2 minutes.6 After the market was closed, production
occurred automatically, transforming all of the labor that producers purchased in the period
into output. Producers received a summary of their purchases, total cost, average cost per unit
and production level. Consumers received ECU equal to their total revenue from the sales of
labor. This was added to their current cash balance, which also re￿ ected any currency carried
over from prior periods.
While the labor market was open, the cost of supplying labor was known only privately to
consumers, while information on current productivity was private information for producers.
For consumers, the history of the wages they received, the average wage in the economy, the
quantity of labor they sold, the in￿ ation rate, the interest rate, and the output gap were
displayed while the market was in operation. For producers, the history of the wages they paid,
the wages in the economy, the quantity of units of labor hired, and the same macroeconomic
variables as shown to consumers, were displayed.
6This was shortened to 1.5 minutes and then to 1 minute in later periods.Frictions, persistence, and central bank policy in an experimental DSGE 9
After the labor market closed for the period, the product market opened. Producers simulta-
neously posted their prices. Subsequently, consumers received the posted prices and information
on their current budget level, the interest rate, their valuations of each good and the ratio of
their valuations and the corresponding prices. Before setting their prices, producers observed
the actual labor they hired, the quantity of output that the labor produced, the total and av-
erage cost of production, and the interest rate. When posting prices, producers had access to
the history of sales, own price, labor expense, pro￿t and a number of macroeconomic variables.
After the consumers ￿nished their purchases, the period ended. At the end of each period
consumers received information about their current earnings and the budget they would have
available for the next period. Producers were informed of their pro￿ts, production, and sales.
Timing of sessions and incentives. Each session took between 3 3=4 and 4 3=4 hours.
A session consisted of instruction and two sequences of periods. After the instructions were
read to subjects, which lasted approximately 45 minutes, the ￿rst sequence began. The ￿rst
sequence consisted of 5 practice periods, and did not count toward the subjects￿￿nal payment.
The next sequence, which constituted the experimental data retained for analysis, consisted
of 50 ￿ 70 periods, and determined the ￿nal payment of the subjects. A random ending rule
was used to end the session, with the ￿nal period drawn randomly from a uniform distribution.
Subjects did not know the process used to end the session, but were told it would end randomly
after period 50. The random ending rule ensured that a fully rational agent, with the payo⁄
function given in equation (6) would maximize the objective function given in equation (1).
Participants in the role of consumers received a monetary payment in proportion to the sum
of the values of (6) they attained over all periods. Valuations for output and costs of labor
supply are expressed in terms of 100th￿ s of a euro cent on subjects￿screens. It is important to
keep in mind that, in contrast to most other studies of experimental markets, the currency used
for transactions, ECU, did not translate directly into the earnings that participants in the role
of consumers received (see Lian and Plott (1998) for a similar structure to ours). There were,
however, strong indirect incentives for consumers to maximize currency holdings, since currency
was required to purchase the products that did yield value for them. ECU earned interest at
rate it between periods t and t + 1.
The savings that consumers held at the end of the session were converted from ECU to euros
(1 euro = 1:38 US dollars at the time of this writing) in the following manner. We assumed that
the experiment would continue forever, with the valuations and costs continuing the downward
trend they followed during the session. We calculated how much a consumer would have earned
if she made the best possible savings, labor sale, and product purchase decisions possible, given
the savings she had at the end of the session. The average prices for labor and products of the
session were used for the calculation. The resulting amount of euro earnings was awarded to
the participant.7
Participants in the role of producers received a monetary payment in proportion to the sum
7For consumers, payo⁄s equalled the sum of the values of equation (6) attained over the life of the economy,
plus the payout based on ￿nal savings. For producers, the conversion rate from ECU payo⁄ to euro was 100 ECU
to 1 Euro.10 C. N. Noussair, D. Pfajfar and J. Zsiros
of the values of (9) they realized over all periods. Although the currency itself was removed
from the ￿rm￿ s balance and added to the currency balance of the consumers, the pro￿ts were
awarded to the participant on paper and translated into real monetary payments to the human
participant in the role of the ￿rm. This was required to create the same incentives and structure
as in the theoretical model.
1.3. Treatments. Table 2 gives a summary of the di⁄erences between treatments.
Treatment Monopolistic competition Human central banker Menu cost for price change
Baseline Yes No No
Menu cost Yes No Yes
Human CB Yes Yes No
Low friction No No No
Table 2: Summary of treatments
The Human Central Banker treatment. Section 1.2 described the Baseline treatment.
The Human Central Banker treatment was identical to the Baseline treatment, except that
three additional human subjects were placed in the role of central banker. Their task was to
set the interest rate. Each of the central bankers submitted a proposed nominal interest rate
simultaneously at the beginning of each period. The median choice was adopted as the interest
rate for the current period. Central bankers were given incentives to attain an in￿ ation rate as
close as possible to 3% in each period. They were incentivized with the following loss function:
Central Banker￿ s Payo⁄lt = max
￿
a ￿ b(￿t ￿ ￿￿)2;0
￿
; (13)
where a = 100, b = 1 and ￿￿ = 3%. The conversion rate from payo⁄s to euro earnings was 1
to 100. Therefore, if in￿ ation rate was 3 % in a given period, then each central banker earned
100 ￿ 1
100 = 1 euro in that period. This payo⁄ function gives incentives to central bankers to
minimize the loss function in equation (5) with ￿ = 0, and thus to engage in in￿ ation targeting.
At the time they made their choice, they had the history of interest rates, in￿ ation, and the
output gap available on their screens.
The Menu Cost treatment. This treatment di⁄ered from Baseline only in that if a
producer set a price in period t, which was di⁄erent than the one he set in period t￿1, he had
to pay a menu cost equal to
Mjt = !pj;t￿1yjt; (14)
where
! = 0:025: (15)
pj;t is the price that producer j chose in period t and yjt￿1 is the quantity of sales of producer
j in the previous period. The calibration of the menu cost is based on Nakamura and SteinssonFrictions, persistence, and central bank policy in an experimental DSGE 11
(2008). Producers who do not change their prices are not required to pay the cost. The menu
cost is subtracted from the producers￿nominal pro￿t (in ECU) at the end of each period.
The Low Friction treatment. The Low Friction treatment was identical to the Baseline
treatment, except for the speci￿cation of the utility function and the preference shock process
for consumers. The payo⁄s for consumers in period t were given by

















with the following identical preference shocks for all consumers:
Ht = ￿ + ￿Ht￿1 + "t; (17)
where ￿ = 120, "t is an independent white noise process, and "t ￿ N(0;￿). The speci￿cation of
the shocks ensures that consumers valued all three goods as perfect substitutes.
The parameters of the economy are calibrated so that welfare for consumers in the Low
Friction and Baseline treatments are approximately identical, under certain assumptions.8 As
in the Baseline treatment, the institution on the product market was a posted o⁄er market with
a separate market for each ￿rm￿ s product.
2. Hypotheses
We advance three hypotheses here. They are evaluated in section three, which also contains an
exploratory analysis of the data. The hypotheses are derived from empirical stylized facts from
the ￿eld, from behavior of the theoretical DSGE model, and from previous experimental re-
sults. The ￿rst hypothesis concerns di⁄erences in the persistence of shocks between treatments.
In the New Keynesian model, both menu costs and market power are required for a shock to
productivity, in￿ ation, or interest rate to exhibit an e⁄ect beyond the current period. Thus, we
hypothesize that persistence of shocks in in￿ ation, interest rate, and output, will be present in
the Menu Cost treatment, but not in the Baseline and the Low Friction treatments.
Hypothesis 1 - Persistence: Shocks to in￿ ation, output, and interest rate have per-
sistent e⁄ects in the Menu Cost treatment. They do not have persistent e⁄ects in
the Baseline, Low Friction, and Human Central Banker treatments.
The second hypothesis concerns the behavior of the human central bankers. It is that their
behavior follows the Taylor principle. The rationale this hypothesis is both theoretical and
empirical. The rule is optimal in the New Keynesian framework, and central bank policies tend
to satisfy the principle. Furthermore, the available evidence suggests that the principle is fairly
8This calibration was conducted in the following manner. The economy was simulated, assuming a markup
of 11 percent, under the assumption that ￿rms and consumers optimize for the current period. The resulting
welfare is calculated and the initial shock parameters are chosen so that welfare in Low Friction is equal to that
in Baseline.12 C. N. Noussair, D. Pfajfar and J. Zsiros
transparent to typical experimental subjects in the role of central bankers in simple economies.9
Hypothesis 2 - Taylor Principle: Under the Human Central Banker treatment,
￿ > 1. Interest rate policy follows the Taylor principle.
The third hypothesis concerns pricing patterns in the economy. We consider whether several
stylized facts from the ￿eld, documented by Nakamura and Steinsson (2008), Bils and Klenow
(2004), and Klenow and Malin (2010), appear in the experiment.
Hypothesis 3 - Pricing Behavior: Price changes between periods t and t+1 exhibit
the following patterns: (a) Positive price changes are more frequent than negative
changes. (b) The frequency of price increases covaries strongly with in￿ ation but
the frequency of price decreases does not. (c) The magnitude of price decreases,
as well as of price increases, covaries strongly with in￿ ation. (d) The hazard rate
of price changes is increasing, that is, price changes are more likely, the longer the
same price has been in e⁄ect.
3. Results
3.1. Overall patterns and treatment di⁄erences in output, welfare and in￿ ation.
Figure 1 shows the real GDP of the economy in each treatment, averaged over the four sessions
comprising the treatment. All treatments have similar GDP at the beginning of the experiment
until roughly period 10. The Baseline and the Human Central Banker treatment have compa-
rable GDP until period 30. After period 30, the Human Central Banker treatment stabilizes
at under 600 ECU, which is the lowest among all treatments. On average, GDP is similar
under the Menu Cost and the Baseline treatments. This suggests that menu costs do not a⁄ect
the real GDP of the economy. GDP is greatest in the Low Friction treatment, where it varies
between 800 and 1000 ECU until period 36. Afterwards, period GDP drops and stabilizes at
700 ECU.10
The welfare in the economy is shown in Figure 2 for the four treatments. Welfare is de￿ned
as the sum of the utilities, as expressed in equation (6), of the three consumers in each period.
Welfare is on average greatest under the Low Friction treatment. It is similar in the other three
treatments, except for the last 20 periods, when Human Central Banker has the lowest welfare.
Average welfare in the Baseline and Menu Cost treatments has a similar time pro￿le. The
overall pattern suggests that a frictionless economy is strictly preferable from a welfare point of
9Engle-Warnick and Turdaliev (2010) also study the monetary policy decisions of inexperienced human sub-
jects. Their economy is a log-linearized variant of the standard DSGE model. They assume that the objective




2. They ￿nd that Taylor-type rules
explain much of the variation of the interest rate decisions of subjects who successfully stabilize the economy.
These subjects￿(approximately 82% of all participants) behavior is consistent with interest rate smoothing, and
the sensitivity to in￿ ation is, on average, close to or above 1 in their interest rate decisions.
10There is no source of growth in the economy, so there is no reason for GDP to increase over time. Indeed,
GDP may decline over time if ￿rms reduce output over time in accordance with a convergence process toward a
monopolitically competitive equilibrium.Frictions, persistence, and central bank policy in an experimental DSGE 13
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Figure 2: Welfare across treatments
Nonparametric tests con￿rm the impression conveyed in the ￿gures. Speci￿cally, under the
Low Friction treatment, we observe signi￿cantly higher employment, real GDP, and welfare than
in any other treatment. The Human Central Banker generates signi￿cantly lower welfare, real
GDP and employment than any other treatment. There are no signi￿cant di⁄erences between
the Baseline and Menu Cost treatments.14 C. N. Noussair, D. Pfajfar and J. Zsiros
The average in￿ ation rate is similar in all four treatments, ranging between -15% and +16%,
except for three outlier periods. Nonparametric tests fail to reject the hypothesis that the level
of in￿ ation is the same between any pair of treatments. Comparing the variances of in￿ ation
between di⁄erent treatments, however, indicates that the variance is the lowest in the Menu
Cost, followed in turn by the Low Friction, Human Central Banker and Baseline treatments.
All of the di⁄erences are statistically signi￿cant according to the Levene (1960) test.
Thus, from a welfare point of view in our experiment, menu costs have an ambiguous e⁄ect.
On one hand, they reduce in￿ ation variance, which has positive e⁄ect on welfare (see Woodford,
2003b). On the other hand, the costs themselves are a deadweight loss to the economy, since
they are deducted from producer pro￿ts and thus from consumer cash holdings. The two e⁄ects
on welfare appear to roughly o⁄set each other.
3.2. Frictions and Persistence of Shocks.
Markup. One measure of friction in a DSGE economy is the markup that ￿rms charge
for their product. In our experimental economies, we are able to estimate the inverse demand
function implied by the observed Dixit-Stiglitz aggregator in the economy, and use it as a
measure of friction. We can thus consider di⁄erences between treatments in the level of friction
the observed economic activity implies. We estimate the following inverse demand function:
lnpjt ￿ lnPt =
1
#
(lnCt ￿ lncjt) + "t; (18)
Pt is the average price in period t and Ct is the total consumption in period t. We estimate
1
# using a panel data population average estimator with cluster-robust standard errors. #
#￿1 is
then the markup, according to the theoretical DSGE model. We can compare these elasticities
with # = 10, corresponding to a markup of roughly 11%, which is a typical estimate in the
DSGE literature (Fernandez-Villaverde, 2009). Table 3 shows the estimated, as well as the
actual average, markups observed in the experiment. The average markup is measured as the
actual pro￿t per unit produced divided by its price.
Baseline Human CB Menu cost Low friction
Elasticity of substitution in demand, # 4.27 4.58 16.40 31.73
Markup implied by # 30.6% 27.8% 6.5% 3.2%
Observed average markup 37.5% 37.5% 22.1% 11.1%
Table 3: Estimated elasticities of substitution in demand and markups for each treatment.
The table reveals that the average markup observed in the economy is between 7 ￿ 15%
higher than the one implied by the estimations of the inverse demand functions. The Low
Friction treatment has the highest value of the elasticity of substitution in demand (#), and
thus the lowest markup, 3:2%. The Menu Cost treatment has a markup roughly twice as great
as the Low Friction treatment. Both the Baseline and Human Central Banker treatments have
much lower values of # than Menu Cost and Low Friction treatments. The estimated markupFrictions, persistence, and central bank policy in an experimental DSGE 15
levels are 30:6% and 27:8% respectively, in these treatments. The actual markup displays similar
treatment di⁄erences as the estimates, though they are typically greater in magnitude. This
shows that the presence of menu costs or perfect competition decreases the market power of
￿rms, although the e⁄ect of a menu cost is smaller. The markup tends to exhibit a slight
increase over time.
Persistence and Correlations. Monopolistic competition and menu costs are the two
frictions that are needed for macroeconomic models to produce persistent e⁄ects of shocks to
macro variables. We begin our analysis with the study of cross-correlations of output with
other macro variables in the four treatments. We then examine the persistence of shocks using
structural vector autoregressions.
variable rho Cross-correlation of output with corr with
t-3 t-2 t-1 t t+1 t+2 t+3 it
Baseline
GDP 0.504 0.190￿￿ 0.208 ￿￿ 0.162￿ 0.209￿￿ 0.102 0.134￿ 0.087 0.291 ￿￿￿
rGDP 0.805 0.716￿￿￿ 0.751￿￿￿ 0.805￿￿￿ 1 0.802￿￿￿ 0.737￿￿￿ 0.696￿￿￿ 0.132￿
rGDPg -0.094 -0.049 -0.090 -0.290￿￿￿ 0.049 0.029 0.001 0.001 0.029
gap 0.757 0.574￿￿￿ 0.625￿￿￿ 0.698￿￿￿ 0.928￿￿￿ 0.721￿￿￿ 0.663￿￿￿ 0.627￿￿￿ 0.216￿￿￿
tot. hours 0.713 0.684￿￿￿ 0.670￿￿￿ 0.718￿￿￿ 0.828￿￿￿ 0.629￿￿￿ 0.612￿￿￿ 0.583￿￿￿ 0.176￿￿
savings 0.992 0.070 0.103 0.136￿ 0.144￿ 0.152￿ 0.158￿ 0.169￿ 0.032
r wages 0.952 0.405￿￿￿ 0.388￿￿￿ 0.350￿￿￿ 0.350￿￿￿ 0.310￿￿￿ 0.254￿￿￿ 0.221￿￿￿ -0.340￿￿￿
prices 0.875 0.109 0.089 0.065 0.027 0.003 0.012 0.000 0.302￿￿￿
in￿ ation 0.467 0.227￿￿￿ 0.149￿ 0.235￿￿￿ 0.216 ￿￿￿ 0.206￿￿ 0.281￿￿￿ 0.274￿￿￿ 0.460￿￿￿
markup 0.958 -0.344￿￿￿ -0.314￿￿￿ -0.264￿￿￿ -0.236￿￿￿ -0.227￿￿￿ -0.205￿￿ -0.176￿￿ 0.308￿￿￿
welfare 0.971 0.552￿￿￿ 0.543￿￿￿ 0.532￿￿￿ 0.537￿￿￿ 0.494￿￿￿ 0.448￿￿￿ 0.434￿￿￿ 0.030
Human Central Banker
GDP 0.920 0.088 0.090 0.097 0.144￿ 0.120 0.131 0.151￿ 0.497￿￿￿
rGDP 0.865 0.791￿￿￿ 0.810￿￿￿ 0.865￿￿￿ 1 0.864￿￿￿ 0.799￿￿￿ 0.776￿￿￿ 0.164￿
rGDPg -0.219 -0.105 -0.176￿￿ -0.291￿￿￿ 0.195￿￿ 0.058 -0.010 -0.012 0.030
gap 0.771 0.638￿￿￿ 0.667￿￿￿ 0.746￿￿￿ 0.928￿￿￿ 0.763￿￿￿ 0.692￿￿￿ 0.671￿￿￿ 0.244￿￿￿
tot. hours 0.797 0.717￿￿￿ 0.738￿￿￿ 0.770￿￿￿ 0.863￿￿￿ 0.731￿￿￿ 0.692￿￿￿ 0.677￿￿￿ -0.091
savings 0.999 -0.054 -0.063 -0.056 -0.055 -0.048 -0.041 -0.039 0.107
r wages 0.899 0.491￿￿￿ 0.466￿￿￿ 0.441￿￿￿ 0.462￿￿￿ 0.421￿￿￿ 0.362￿￿￿ 0.302￿￿￿ 0.004
prices 0.990 0.011 0.007 0.011 0.014 0.036 0.049 0.062 0.418￿￿￿
in￿ ation 0.218 0.162￿ 0.196￿￿ 0.193￿￿ 0.112 0.132￿ 0.097 0.039 0.136￿
markup 0.951 -0.591￿￿￿ -0.571￿￿￿ -0.541￿￿￿ -0.545￿￿￿ -0.530￿￿￿ -0.503￿￿￿ -0.479￿￿￿ -0.005
welfare 0.945 0.615￿￿￿ 0.607￿￿￿ 0.613￿￿￿ 0.604￿￿￿ 0.578￿￿￿ 0.550￿￿￿ 0.525￿￿￿ 0.136￿
￿p < 0:05; ￿￿p < 0:01; ￿￿￿p < 0:001
Table 4: Cross-correlations for the Baseline and Human Central Banker treatments
In tables 4 and 5, we report the cross-correlations of output with other macro variables in the
experiment. These illustrate the functioning of the monetary policy transmission mechanism.
The tables show that persistence of real GDP is lowest in the Low Friction and greatest in
the Human Central Banker treatment. The other two treatments produce a similar degree of
persistence.16 C. N. Noussair, D. Pfajfar and J. Zsiros
The output gap and labor employed (which can be thought of as total hours worked) are
highly correlated with output contemporaneously, as well as at all leads and lags. The weak-
est cross-correlations occur in the Low Friction treatment. Savings are at best only weakly
correlated with output. An exception is the Low Friction treatment, where highly signi￿cant
countercyclical behavior is observed. The strongest correlation is between lagged savings and
current output. The negative sign is rather unexpected as one might expect savings to be
procyclical. Except in the Menu Cost treatment, real wages exhibit signi￿cant positive cross-
correlation with output of 0:3 ￿ 0:5, similar values to those found in ￿eld data.
variable rho Cross-correlation of output with corr with
t-3 t-2 t-1 t t+1 t+2 t+3 it
Menu Cost
GDP 0.724 0.052 0.086 0.119 0.339￿￿￿ 0.107 0.116 0.066 -0.070
rGDP 0.770 0.706￿￿￿ 0.746￿￿￿ 0.770￿￿￿ 1 0.767￿￿￿ 0.734￿￿￿ 0.694￿￿￿ -0.041
rGDPg -0.339 -0.064 -0.033 -0.361￿￿￿ 0.217￿￿￿ 0.026 0.017 0.005 -0.150￿
gap 0.627 0.539￿￿￿ 0.595￿￿￿ 0.637￿￿￿ 0.940￿￿￿ 0.661￿￿￿ 0.629￿￿￿ 0.585￿￿￿ -0.124
tot. hours 0.723 0.657￿￿￿ 0.654￿￿￿ 0.672￿￿￿ 0.827￿￿￿ 0.639￿￿￿ 0.658￿￿￿ 0.657￿￿￿ 0.079
savings 0.987 0.098 0.091 0.087 0.093 0.104 0.105 0.092 -0.029
r wages 0.227 0.081 0.072 0.048 0.115 0.162￿ 0.160￿ 0.155￿ -0.090
prices 0.987 -0.675￿￿￿ -0.684￿￿￿ -0.682￿￿￿ -0.684￿￿￿ -0.675￿￿￿ -0.644￿￿￿ -0.646￿￿￿ -0.040
in￿ ation 0.308 0.249￿￿￿ 0.186￿￿ 0.192￿￿ 0.107 0.014 0.081 0.162￿ 0.245￿￿￿
markup 0.805 -0.175￿￿ -0.175￿￿ -0.110 -0.086 -0.102 -0.142￿ -0.204￿￿ 0.087
welfare 0.827 0.465￿￿￿ 0.472￿￿￿ 0.489￿￿￿ 0.510￿￿￿ 0.479￿￿￿ 0.391￿￿￿ 0.353￿￿￿ 0.160￿
Low Friction
GDP 0.923 -0.196￿￿ -0.220￿￿￿ -0.219￿￿￿ -0.116 -0.258￿￿￿ -0.281￿￿￿ -0.274￿￿￿ 0.240￿￿￿
rGDP 0.610 0.515￿￿￿ 0.504￿￿￿ 0.610￿￿￿ 1 0.622￿￿￿ 0.529￿￿￿ 0.561￿￿￿ -0.051
rGDPg -0.312 -0.007 -0.100 -0.450￿￿￿ 0.355￿￿￿ 0.118 -0.024 0.098 -0.142￿
gap 0.537 0.360￿￿￿ 0.356￿￿￿ 0.489￿￿￿ 0.938￿￿￿ 0.535￿￿￿ 0.428￿￿￿ 0.462￿￿￿ -0.072
tot. hours 0.413 0.460￿￿￿ 0.364￿￿￿ 0.393￿￿￿ 0.715￿￿￿ 0.317￿￿￿ 0.270￿￿￿ 0.335￿￿￿ 0.057
savings 0.995 -0.196￿￿ -0.195￿￿ -0.210￿￿￿ -0.193 ￿￿ -0.188￿￿ -0.189￿￿ -0.182￿￿ 0.018
r wages 0.503 0.144￿ 0.206 ￿￿ 0.284￿￿￿ 0.358￿￿￿ 0.248￿￿￿ 0.222￿￿￿ 0.231￿￿￿ -0.027
prices 0.999 -0.333￿￿￿ -0.348￿￿￿ -0.369￿￿￿ -0.376￿￿￿ -0.407￿￿￿ -0.409￿￿￿ -0.409￿￿￿ 0.206￿￿
in￿ ation -0.113 0.208￿￿￿ 0.179￿￿ 0.174￿￿ 0.201 ￿￿ -0.015 0.038 0.087 -0.05
markup 0.853 0.044 0.082 0.105 0.178￿￿ 0.174￿￿ 0.095 0.081 -0.026
welfare 0.882 0.541￿￿￿ 0.540￿￿￿ 0.551￿￿￿ 0.575￿￿￿ 0.533￿￿￿ 0.509￿￿￿ 0.513￿￿￿ -0.050
￿p < 0:05; ￿￿p < 0:01; ￿￿￿p < 0:001
Table 5: Cross-correlations for the Menu Cost and Low Friction treatments
The strength of the correlation between price level and output di⁄ers between treatments. In
the Baseline and Human Central Banker treatments, there is no signi￿cant correlation, while in
the Menu Cost and Low Friction treatments we observe a highly signi￿cant negative relationship.
This is especially pronounced in the Menu Cost treatment, where cross-correlations reach values
between ￿0:6and ￿ 0:7. In the ￿eld, negative correlations of similar magnitude are typically
observed. Kydland and Prescott (1990) argue that the negative contemporaneous relationship
between output and prices suggests that supply shocks have prevailing e⁄ects over demand
shocks. This is indeed the case in our experiment, where supply shocks are relatively moreFrictions, persistence, and central bank policy in an experimental DSGE 17
important than demand shocks. Another factor that is intimately related to this correlation
is price stickiness. As pointed out by Ball and Mankiw (1994), even if the demand shock is
prevalent, it is possible to observe negative correlations if there are frictions in the price setting
mechanism. This can explain the weaker cross-correlations in Menu Cost, compared to the three
other treatments.
Cross-correlations between in￿ ation and output, shown in Table 6, are only signi￿cant for
lags of in￿ ation. The only exception to this pattern is the Baseline treatment, which exhibits
signi￿cant procyclical behavior for all leads and lags, but most strongly at t+2 and t+3: The
cross-correlations between markup and output show quite a di⁄erent pattern. In the Baseline
and Human Central Banker treatments, the correlations are signi￿cantly negative, while in the
Low Friction treatment they are signi￿cantly positive. In the former treatments, producers
exploit their market power. This leads to a reduction in output. In Low Friction, however, this
cannot occur due to ￿erce competition. As shown in table 3, the markups were indeed greatest
under Baseline and Human Central Banker. In the Menu Cost treatment, the correlations are
negative and only signi￿cant at long leads and lags. In all treatments, the cross-correlations
with welfare are positive and highly signi￿cant (between 0:5 ￿ 0:6).
in￿ ation
gap t-3 t-2 t-1 t t+1 t+2 t+3
Baseline treatment 0.309￿￿￿ 0.323￿￿￿ 0.249￿￿￿ 0.268￿￿￿ 0.289￿￿￿ 0.192￿￿ 0.284￿￿￿
Human Central Banker treat. -0.001 0.050 0.082 0.058 0.174￿￿ 0.171￿ 0.117
Menu Cost treatment 0.107 0.008 -0.073 0.041 0.145￿ 0.131￿ 0.215￿￿
Low Friction treatment 0.074 0.019 -0.047 0.195￿￿ 0.176￿￿ 0.189￿￿ 0.213￿￿￿
￿p < 0:05; ￿￿p < 0:01; ￿￿￿p < 0:001
Table 6: Correlations between in￿ ation and output gap
The correlations between nominal interest rates and other variables illustrate the in￿ uences
on, and the e⁄ects of, monetary policy. There is some heterogeneity across treatments. Nominal
GDP is positively correlated with interest rate in all treatments, except for Menu Cost. In the
￿eld data, positive correlation of similar magnitude to that in the Baseline treatment is typi-
cally observed. Positive correlations are also observed between the real GDP and output gap
in the Baseline and Human Central Banker treatments. In the remaining two treatments, these
correlations are not signi￿cant. Nominal interest rate and real GDP growth are negatively cor-
related. The correlations are weakly signi￿cant in the Menu Cost and Low Friction treatments,
but insigni￿cant in the Baseline and Human Central Banker treatments. The correlation with
real wages is only signi￿cant (and negative) in the Baseline treatment. Price level and in￿ ation
are signi￿cantly positively correlated with interest rate in the Baseline and Human Central
Banker treatments. In the Low Friction treatment, the correlation is only signi￿cant for the
price level. Under Menu Cost, it is signi￿cant only for in￿ ation. The ￿eld evidence regarding
these correlations is mixed, but usually found to be weaker in magnitude than those in the
Baseline treatment. Prices and wages tend to comove in the ￿eld, as well as in our experiment,
except for the Baseline treatment.18 C. N. Noussair, D. Pfajfar and J. Zsiros
3.3. VAR and impulse response functions. The persistence of macroeconomic variables
is analyzed using di⁄erent methods. First we focus on the cyclical behavior of in￿ ation and on
the cross-correlation analysis of in￿ ation and output gap (see Yun, 1996) as detailed in table
6. The greatest degree of persistence is observed for the Baseline treatment, which produces
remarkably similar persistence patterns to those generated in simulations, when 85% of ￿rms
change their price each period. Indeed, this is the actual frequency with which prices are changed
under Baseline (section 3.5 analyzes price patterns in detail). Some persistence is also observed
in the Low Friction treatment. In the remaining two treatments, we observe less persistence.
Overall, the observed persistence in our experiment is not as pronounced as is usually observed
in major developed economies (see e.g. Yun, 1996 for the US). Generally, the cross-correlations
are greater for leads than for lags of in￿ ation. This is consistent with the fact that technology
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Figure 3: Impulse Responses for Baseline treatment. Note: Orthogonalized impulse responses
are plotted. 95% error bands are calculated using bootstrap techniques. IRFX, infX, gapX
denotes IRF for group X, e⁄ect of inf shock to gap.
The most common methodology employed in empirical monetary economics to assess the
persistence of shocks is to estimate a structural vector autoregression (SVAR) and to plot the
impulse responses. We follow this literature by estimating a trivariate VAR with two lags
of output gap, in￿ ation and interest rate. The appropriate identi￿cation scheme to use for
our data is not obvious. In the literature, three options have attracted particular attention:
Choleski decomposition, long run restrictions, and sign restrictions. However, they each haveFrictions, persistence, and central bank policy in an experimental DSGE 19
advantages and disadvantages. Estimating the VAR using Choleski decomposition, we would
fall into the trap described in Carlstrom, Fuerst, and Paustian (2009). They show that the IRFs
can be severely muted if one assumes Choleski decomposition and the model actually does not
exhibit the assumed timing. This critique does apply in the case of our experiment, where the
demand, supply, and monetary policy shocks contemporaneously in￿ uence the realizations of
in￿ ation, output gap and interest rate. Therefore, Choleski decomposition is not an appropriate
identi￿cation scheme. Long-run and sign restrictions have also been criticized (see, e.g. Faust
and Leeper, 1997 and Chari, Kehoe, and McGrattan, 2008). Speci￿cally, long-run restrictions
tend to su⁄er from truncation bias as ￿nite order VARs are not good approximations of in￿nite
order VARs. However, we believe that the truncation bias is less severe than the misspeci￿ed
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Figure 4: Impulse Responses for the Human Central Banker treatment. Note: Orthogonalized
impulse responses are plotted. 95% error bands are calculated using bootstrap techniques.
IRFX, infX, gapX denotes IRF for group X, e⁄ect of inf shock to gap.
Figures 3 - 6 display the IRFs of one representative session in each treatment (for comparison
across sessions see Table A14 in Appendix). There are a number of regularities that are common
to all treatments. A productivity shock induces a positive change in the output gap. In￿ ation
reacts negatively to the productivity shock, though the reaction usually dissipates in a few
periods. It appears that a positive productivity shock increases competition in the ￿nal product
market. The e⁄ect of productivity shock on interest rate is rather ambiguous. However, this is20 C. N. Noussair, D. Pfajfar and J. Zsiros
in line with the feature that our Taylor rule is set to respond only to in￿ ation, and not to the
output gap. Except for the last reaction, which is usually found to be positive, the e⁄ects of
the productivity shock correspond to stylized facts for major industrialized economies.
The demand shock induces a reaction of in￿ ation that is similar in sign. The persistence
of this reaction varies substantially across treatments. It exhibits almost no persistence in the
Low Friction treatment, while in other treatments, at least in some sessions, the shock lives for
a few periods. In most sessions, the output gap reacts in the same direction as the demand
shock, although in two sessions the reaction is opposite in sign and signi￿cant. The demand
shock induces a change in interest rate that is similar in sign for most of the sessions. This is
in line with the stabilizing objective of interest rates that are set in accordance with the Taylor
principle. In the Human Central Banker treatment, all four sessions exhibit this property. This
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Figure 5: Impulse Responses for the Menu Cost treatment. Note: Orthogonalized impulse
responses are plotted. 95% error bands are calculated using bootstrap techniques. IRFX,
infX, gapX denotes IRF for group X, e⁄ect of inf shock to gap.
The last shock that we study is the monetary policy shock. This shock is di⁄erent in
nature in our Human Central Banker treatment, compared to all other treatments, in which the
interest rate was set according to the instrumental rule speci￿ed in (13).11 In Human Central
11We reported the interest rate in the experiment to one decimal point accuracy. Therefore the monetary
policy shock could be identi￿ed as the residual from the reported rounded interest rate and the actual interest
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Banker, the monetary policy shock induces a change in interest rate that is similar in sign.
The persistence of this shock varies considerably across sessions, but generally it is greater
than in other treatments. Note that we have not embedded any persistence in the monetary
policy shock. The Taylor rule we implemented does not exhibit interest rate smoothing and the
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Figure 6: Impulse Responses for the Low Friction treatment. Note: Orthogonalized impulse
responses are plotted. 95% error bands are calculated using bootstrap techniques. IRFX,
infX, gapX denotes IRF for group X, e⁄ect of inf shock to gap.
A contractionary monetary policy usually has no signi￿cant e⁄ect on the output gap, and
in some cases even increases the output gap. In our experiment, the interest rate changes
induce both substitution and income e⁄ects to the consumers, due to their accumulation of
savings. Therefore, in principle, it is possible that higher interest rates increase output, although
the evidence from empirical macroeconomics supports a negative e⁄ect. In our experimental
economy, there are no e⁄ects of interest rate that go through the supply side. In all but three
sessions, in￿ ation reacts positively to the contractionary monetary policy shock, although this
reaction is often not signi￿cant. However, a similar pattern is also commonly found in VAR
studies of the monetary policy transmission mechanism and is referred to as the price puzzle
(Sims, 1992, Eichenbaum, 1992). The e⁄ect of a monetary policy shock on in￿ ation and output
gap displays the least persistence in the Low Friction treatment.
The e⁄ects of demand and monetary policy shocks correspond, for the most part, to stylized
facts. Figures 3 - 6 suggest similar persistence of shocks for output gap and interest rate in22 C. N. Noussair, D. Pfajfar and J. Zsiros
the Menu Cost and the Baseline treatments. Moreover, the Low Friction treatment exhibits
a very low degree of persistence, and shocks rarely last more than one period. To further
compare the persistence of shocks between di⁄erent treatments, we design a simple comparison
test. We compute the number of periods for which output gap, in￿ ation and interest rate
deviate signi￿cantly from their long-run steady states as a result of a positive one-standard-
deviation shock. The values are presented in the table 7. We then compare these values using
nonparametric tests, with each session as the unit of observation.
# of periods (sig.)
Treatment output gap in￿ ation interest rate
Baseline 10 3 10 6 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 1
Human Central Banker 3 1 3 5 0 8 0 0 2 9 5 2
Menu Cost 10 10 4 2 1 6 1 0 0 1 1 1
Low Friction 1 2 2 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Table 7: Persistence of shocks
As mentioned above, we do not observe much persistence of monetary policy shocks on
interest rates, except in Human Central Banker. These di⁄erences are signi￿cant at the 5%
level under standard nonparametric tests. The only signi￿cant di⁄erence regarding the e⁄ect
of demand shocks on in￿ ation is between the Menu Cost and Low Friction treatments (5%
signi￿cance). The most interesting results are for the output gap, where the Baseline and Menu
Cost treatments exhibit more persistence then the other treatments. In particular, Baseline
and Menu Cost treatments are signi￿cantly di⁄erent from the other two treatments at the 5%
level, using a Kruskal-Wallis test. The Baseline treatment is also signi￿cantly di⁄erent than the
Human Central Banker treatment at the 10% level.
The relative importance of shocks for the determination of interest rate, in￿ ation and the
output gap, can be measured with a variance decomposition exercise, using our VAR esti-
mations. We ￿nd considerable di⁄erences between the Human Central Banker and the other
treatments. The demand shock is the shock that explains the most variance of interest rate
in the other three treatments. In the Human Central Banker treatment, however, interest rate
smoothing explains a greater proportion of the variability of interest rates.
3.4. Behavior of human central bankers. Hypothesis 2 proposed that human central
bankers￿interest rate decisions satisfy the Taylor principle. We evaluate the hypothesis with
the following regression:
it = ￿1it￿1 + (1 ￿ ￿1)(￿2￿t￿1 + ￿3yt￿1) + "t (19)
The estimation employs the linear dynamic panel-data GMM estimation developed by Arel-
lano and Bover (1995) and Blundell and Bond (1998). The standard errors are clustered by
session and obtained by bootstrap estimations with 1000 replications. We estimate two di⁄er-
ent speci￿cations, one for individual decisions over interest rates (ind) and one for the actual
interest rate (group) in the economy (recall that the interest rate implemented is the medianFrictions, persistence, and central bank policy in an experimental DSGE 23











Table 8: Taylor-rule regressions. Note: Coe¢ cients are based on Blundell-Bond system GMM
estimator. Standard errors in parentheses are calculated using bootstrap procedures (1000
replications) that take into account potential presence of clusters in sessions. */**/*** denotes
signi￿cance at 10/5/1 percent level.
The test of hypothesis 2 is whether ￿2 satis￿es the Taylor principle. The Taylor principle
is that the response of the nominal interest rate to in￿ ation must be greater than 1 in order
to guarantee determinacy (Woodford, 2003b). In our economy, determinacy is guaranteed if
￿1 + (1 ￿ ￿1)￿2 > 0:12 This condition is clearly satis￿ed in our case. ￿2 in our case is 1:47,
which is very close to 1.5, the coe¢ cient originally proposed by Taylor, and ￿1 is 0:90. We
also tested for a nonlinearity in policy. In particular, we considered whether there was an
asymmetry in the sensitivity of interest rates to in￿ ation, depending on whether in￿ ation was
above or below the target level of 3 percent. We found that there was no asymmetry of that
form. In section 3.4, we evaluate the pricing patterns listed in hypothesis 3.
3.5. Price setting behavior of ￿rms.
Frequency of price changes. We start by focusing on the overall frequency of price
changes. Table 9 contains a summary of the incidence and direction of price changes in our
experimental economy as a percentage of the total number of opportunities to change prices.
In our experiment, on average, 74:5% of the time, ￿rms change their prices in a period. Al-
varez Gonzalez (2008) presents estimates of the mean frequency of price changes from datasets
underlying national CPIs. Prices exhibit nominal stickiness, with an estimated mean frequency
of price changes of 19% per month, corresponding to 46:9% over a three month quarter, under
the assumption of a constant hazard rate. Furthermore, Klenow and Kryvtsov (2008) suggest
that the average monthly frequency of price changes is 36:2% (or 73:8% per quarter) for posted
prices between 1988 and 2005.13
12The full set of conditions are reported in Bullard and Mitra (2007).
13Their estimation is based on monthly data from all products in the three largest metropolitan areas in the US
and for food and fuel products in all areas, and bimonthly for all other prices. Their estimated weighted median
frequency of monthly price changes is 27.3%. However, it is di¢ cult to directly compare these frequencies with
experimental data due to potential di⁄erences in the de￿nition of period. The percentages are close to those in
our data if each of our periods is compared to one 3-month quarter.24 C. N. Noussair, D. Pfajfar and J. Zsiros
Price changes Positive price changes Negative price changes
Treatment (as a % of all cases) (as a % of all cases) (as a % of all cases)
All 74.5 47.5 (64%) 27.0 (36%)
Baseline 85.9 52.1 (61%) 33.8 (39%)
Human CB 84.8 52.6 (62%) 32.1 (38%)
Menu cost 40.9 31.1 (76%) 9.8 (24%)
Low friction 86.3 53.9 (63%) 32.4 (37%)
Table 9: Summary of positive and negative price changes
There is virtually no di⁄erence between the Baseline, Human Central Banker and Low
Friction treatments (the price changes in about 85% of possible instances). Non-parametric
tests, using sessions as observations, show no signi￿cant di⁄erences in the frequency of price
changes between these treatments. However, there are signi￿cant di⁄erences between the Menu
Cost and each of the other treatments at the 3% signi￿cance level. In the Menu Cost treatment,
￿rms change their prices 40:9% of the time, which is roughly half of the average percentage of
instances that ￿rms change their prices in the other treatments. Thus, the introduction of menu
costs has a signi￿cant e⁄ect on the price setting behavior of ￿rms.
Vermeulen, Dias, Dossche, Gautier, Hernando, Sabbatini, and Stahl (2007) ￿nd that the
degree of competition a⁄ects the frequency of price changes. The greater the degree of compe-
tition, the greater the frequency of price changes, especially decreases. Here, we also ￿nd the
greatest frequency of changes in the Low Friction treatment, the most competitive condition,
although it is not statistically di⁄erent from the Baseline treatment. The same pattern holds if
positive and negative price changes are considered separately.
Nakamura and Steinsson (2008) report that 64:8% of price changes in the US are increases.
This percentage corresponds closely to our experiment, as can be seen in table 9. In our data,
64% of price changes are price increases, and 36% are decreases. The behavior in the Menu
Cost treatment is once again signi￿cantly di⁄erent from the other treatments at the 5 percent
level. Under Menu Cost, 76% of price changes are increases, while only 24% are decreases. The
percentages in the other three treatments are not signi￿cantly di⁄erent from each other.
Size of price changes. Table 10 gives a summary of the average and average absolute
price changes in the experiment. The average absolute price change is 12% in the experiment
across all treatments while average price change is 2:8%. These numbers suggest that price
decreases are an important component of price setting behavior of ￿rms. The pattern of the
size of average and average absolute price changes is comparable with the empirical results
of Klenow and Kryvtsov (2008), who report a 14% average absolute price change and a 0:8%
average price change.
The comparison of treatments reveals that the Menu Cost and Low Friction treatments are
fundamentally di⁄erent from the other two treatments in their price setting behavior. Average
price changes are approximately 3:5% in the Baseline and Human Central Banker treatments.
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2 ￿ 2:5%. Prices decreases are both more likely and somewhat larger, though not signi￿cantly
so. There is a similar pattern in absolute price changes. The sizes of these changes average
16% and 12% in the Baseline and Human Central Banker treatments, and 8:9% in the Menu
Cost and Low Friction treatments. Therefore, both the competitiveness of the market and the
introduction of a menu cost a⁄ects the pricing behavior of ￿rms. The introduction of a menu
cost decreases, while monopolistic competition increases, average absolute price changes.
Average price Average abs. price Average pos. price Average neg. price
Treatment changes in ECU (%) changes in ECU (%) changes in ECU (%) changes in ECU (%)
All 1.112 (2.88%) 7.890 (11.98%) 7.364 (12.4%) -8.8126 (-11.2%)
Baseline 0.239 (3.72%) 9.921 (16.32%) 8.404 (17.0%) -12.26 (-15.2%)
Human CB 3.270 (3.35%) 11.421 (12.43%) 12.302 (13.2%) -9.9779 (-11.2%)
Menu cost 0.407 (1.90%) 2.865 (8.87%) 2.53 (8.9%) -3.9014 (-8.8%)
Low friction 0.694 (2.57%) 5.113 (8.84%) 4.737 (9.5%) -5.7377 (-7.8%)
Table 10: Average and average absolute price changes
Nakamura and Steinsson (2008) also report separate statistics regarding the magnitude of
positive and negative price changes. The median absolute size of price changes is 8:5%, the
median size of price increases is 7:3%, and the median of price decreases is 10:5%. Table 10
also presents the average positive and negative price changes of the experiment both in terms
of ECU and in percentage terms. The average positive price change is 12%, while the average
negative price change is 11% in the experiment. In all treatments, the average magnitude of
positive price changes is greater than that of negative price changes. Thus, the experiment
does not con￿rm the stylized fact that price decreases are greater than increases. However, the
di⁄erence in the size of positive and negative price changes is not statistically signi￿cant in any
treatment.
Price changes are greatest in the Baseline treatment, where the magnitude of positive (neg-
ative) price changes is 17% (15%). The Human Central Banker treatment has a slightly smaller
average magnitude of price changes, while in other two treatments the average is below 10%.
However, the di⁄erences between treatments are not signi￿cant. The average absolute positive
price changes are always smaller than the average negative price changes except in the Human
Central Banker treatment.14
Price changes and in￿ ation. Klenow and Kryvtsov (2008) decompose monthly in￿ ation
into the fraction of items with price changes and the average size of those price changes. In
their sample, they ￿nd that the correlation between the fraction of prices that increase and
the overall in￿ ation rate is 0:25, which means that the fraction is not highly correlated with
14Klenow and Malin (2010) discusses higher moments of the price changes. They report the kurtosis of the dis-
tribution of price changes is 10.0 for posted prices and 17.4 for regular prices. In our experiment, the distribution
of all price changes has a 22.3 kurtosis, which is in the same magnitude as the empirical ￿ndings. The kurtosis
is 11.3 in the Baseline treatment, 17.4 in Human Central Banker, 119.4 in Menu Cost, and 33.1 in Low Friction.
This heterogeneity con￿rms the di⁄erences in the price setting behavior between treatments. The ￿gures from
the Baseline and Human Central Banker treatments are close to empirical ￿ndings. In the Menu Cost treatment
there are more extreme price changes.26 C. N. Noussair, D. Pfajfar and J. Zsiros
in￿ ation. The average size of changes, however, has a correlation with in￿ ation of 0:99, and
thus comoves almost perfectly with in￿ ation. In our data we ￿nd similar patterns. The fraction
of prices changing is relatively stable and not highly correlated with in￿ ation (0:10) in the
pooled sample, however the average magnitude of price changes has a higher correlation (0:53)
with in￿ ation. The Baseline and Human Central Banker treatments exhibit similar correlation
between magnitude and in￿ ation (￿ 0:5), while the Menu Cost and Low Friction treatments
have much greater correlations of roughly 0:84 and 0:79, respectively. Generally, the Menu Cost
treatment ￿gures are the closest to the ￿eld data.15
Time Pro￿le of Hazard Rate of Price Changes. The hazard function of price changes
indicates the probability of a price change, depending upon the length of time that the same
price has been in e⁄ect. Intuitively one might anticipate an upward sloping function, i.e. the
longer the prices are ￿xed the higher the probability of changing them, particularly if there
is a positive underlying rate of in￿ ation. However, di⁄erent theoretical models and empirical
results suggest also the possibility of a ￿ at or downward sloping hazard function. Klenow and
Malin (2010) summarize the theoretical predictions for the hazard functions of di⁄erent price-
setting models. They show that the Calvo model assumes a ￿ at hazard function, while the
Taylor model predicts a zero hazard except at a single point in time, where the hazard is one.
Furthermore, they point out that ￿menu cost models can generate a variety of shapes depending
on the relative importance of transitory and permanent shocks to marginal costs. Permanent
shocks, which accumulate over time, tend to yield an upward sloping hazard function, while
transitory shocks tend to ￿ atten or even produce a downward-sloping hazard function.￿
In the empirical literature, the general result is that hazard functions are not upward-sloping.
Klenow and Kryvtsov (2008) ￿nd the frequency of price changes conditional on reaching a given
age is downward sloping if all goods are considered. When they exclude decile ￿xed e⁄ects,
the hazard rates become constant. Nakamura and Steinsson (2008) estimate separate hazard
functions for di⁄erent classes of goods, and they ￿nd that hazard functions are downward
sloping in the ￿rst few months, and constant after that period. Ikeda and Nishioka (2007),
using Japanese CPI data, contrary to previous empirical research, ￿nd upward sloping hazard
functions. They use a ￿nite-mixture model and assume a Weibull distribution for price changes.
They estimate increasing hazard functions for some products, and constant functions for others.
Table 11 shows the di⁄erences between treatments in the duration of price spells. The
average durations are 1:17, 1:16 and 1:15 in the Baseline, Human Central Banker and Low
Friction treatments. The Menu Cost treatment has an average of 2:41, signi￿cantly di⁄erent at
3% from any of the other treatments.
The slope of the hazard function can be evaluated in our data. We assume a hazard function
of the following form:
￿i(tjxj) = ￿i￿0(t)weibull(xi;j￿); (20)
where i indexes producers, j indexes observations, ￿i is a producer speci￿c random variable that
re￿ ects unobserved heterogeneity in the level of the hazard, ￿0(t) is a nonparametric baseline
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dur Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
All 2104 1.34 1.12 1 21
Baseline 612 1.16 0.45 1 4
Human CB 561 1.18 0.57 1 6
Menu cost 287 2.42 2.47 1 21
Low friction 641 1.16 0.56 1 8
Table 11: Descriptive statistics of price spells
hazard function, xi;j is a vector of covariates, and ￿ is a vector of parameters. We assume
that ￿i ￿ Gamma(1;￿2
￿). As in Ikeda and Nishioka (2007), we assume a Weibull distribution
in the hazard function, given by weibull(xi;j￿) = xi;j￿ ￿ p ￿ tp￿1, where p is a parameter to
be estimated. Under this distributional assumption, we can test explicitly whether the hazard
function is upward sloping so that p > 1, downward sloping with p < 1, or constant with p = 1.
The independent variables in the regressions are the wage of the ￿rm, amount of labor
hired, lagged value of the ￿rm￿ s price, lagged value of its pro￿t, lagged value of its unsold
products, productivity shock, lagged value of the real interest rate and lagged value of the
output gap. Individual di⁄erences are captured by producer-speci￿c dummies (￿i). The hazard
rate is estimated for the pooled data, for each treatment and also for each subject separately.
The estimation results can be found in Table A11 in the Appendix. There are signi￿cant
explanatory variables in the regressions. Wage, amount of labor hired, lagged value of unsold
products, lagged pro￿ts, and dummy for positive pro￿t in the previous period are signi￿cant
in the pooled regression. All of the hazard functions are upward sloping. When menu costs
are present, average price spells are longer, (see Figure A.3 in the Appendix). As shown in
Table A11, the estimated values of p are about 2:5 in all treatments except under Menu Cost,
where p = 1:55. All of these estimates are signi￿cantly greater than 1 at the 1% signi￿cance
level, indicating a signi￿cantly increasing hazard rate. These results are in line with Ikeda and
Nishioka (2007), though di⁄er from the ￿ndings generally reported in the literature.
4. Conclusion
In this study, we construct a laboratory DSGE economy populated with human decision makers.
The experiment allows us to create the structure of a DSGE economy, but to make no prior
assumptions about the behavior of agents. Di⁄erent treatments allow us to study whether the
assumptions of menu costs and monopolistic competition are essential to create the frictions
required to make the economy conform to empirical stylized facts. The experiment allows the
possibility that the behavior of human agents alone creates the requisite friction.
All of the results depend on whether we have been able to create a well-functioning econ-
omy, from which meaningful data can be extracted. This means that the complexity of the
economy is not so great as to be beyond the capabilities of the participating human agents.
The data provide clear evidence that economies with this level of complexity are amenable to
experimentation. None of our subjects lost money overall or consistently made poor decisions.28 C. N. Noussair, D. Pfajfar and J. Zsiros
The empirical patterns and treatment di⁄erences lend themselves to intuitive ex-post expla-
nations, though many of these would not have been anticipated ex-ante. Thus, in our view,
experiments, in conjunction with traditional empirical methods, can increase our understanding
of how a macroeconomy operates.
The speci￿c focus of the experiment reported here is the role of frictions in generating some
stylized empirical facts. Comparison of our Baseline and Menu Cost treatments allows us to
consider the e⁄ect of the addition of menu costs on the economy, holding all else equal. We
￿nd that the existence of monopolistic competition, in conjunction with the behavior of human
agents, generates a considerable level of persistence, which is similar whether or not menu costs
are present. Thus, with our boundedly rational agents, menu costs are not necessary to create
persistence in the output gap. We also observe that the levels of GDP and welfare are also
not substantially di⁄erent with or without explicit menu costs. Nevertheless, menu costs have
an e⁄ect on prices. Average markups are smaller under menu costs, perhaps as a result of
greater forward-looking considerations in price setting, and thus menu costs inhibit the exercise
of market power. Sellers, when facing a menu cost, appear to seek to guarantee sales over
multiple future periods, by setting relatively low prices. In the absence of the menu cost, they
are aware that they can lower their prices in any future period if they have been undercut by
other sellers. While menu costs do not a⁄ect the level of in￿ ation, they reduce its variability.
The bene￿t from this lower variability o⁄sets the direct deadweight loss of the cost itself, and
results in an insigni￿cant net e⁄ect on welfare.
Comparing the Baseline and Low Friction treatments allows us to analyze the di⁄erences
between perfect and monopolistic competition. Low Friction is characterized by greater output,
employment, and welfare, as well as smaller price markups than Baseline. The Low Friction
treatment generates virtually no persistence of shocks, in contrast to Baseline, in which per-
sistence is observed. Bounded rationality does not create persistence of shocks under perfect
competition.
Under perfect competition, consumers￿ purchase and ￿rms￿ output pricing decisions are
straightforward. Consumers simply buy at the lowest price, and thus face a one-dimensional
problem. Producers face a situation in which charging too high a markup can result in large
losses, and thus there is powerful feedback reinforcing convergence to competitive pricing. This
means that productivity shocks must be immediately passed through to output prices for pro-
ducers to avoid losses. This competitive behavior is conducive to high output, welfare, and
employment levels.
Under monopolistic competition, on the other hand, consumers face a multi-dimensional
problem. They must compare the di⁄erence between the marginal utility and price of each of
the goods, and choose the one yielding the greatest surplus. Reoptimization is required for each
individual purchase, since marginal utility changes with each purchase. For producers, there is
a relatively smooth tradeo⁄ between price and sales, unlike the all-or-nothing tradeo⁄s under
perfect competition. The parameters of this tradeo⁄ depend in a complex manner on the other
￿rms￿prices, as well as on the shocks to preferences for each of the goods. In light of complexity,
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changes in behavior, as long as their current strategies seen to be working reasonably well. This
inertia in decision making can cause slow adjustment and thus shock persistence. Such inertia
is very costly under perfect competition, and can lead to large losses.
Humans, when given the role of discretionary central bankers in our experiment, tend to em-
ploy the Taylor principle. They make relatively large adjustments in interest rates in response
to a deviation of in￿ ation from the target level. Interest rate decisions show considerable persis-
tence, despite the absence of explicit incentives for central banks to have them do so. Though
typically applying the Taylor principle, our Human Central Bankers achieved lower levels of
GDP and welfare than those attained under a simple instrumental rule. This can be seen in a
comparison of the Baseline and Human Central Banker treatments. As illustrated in ￿gures 1
and 2, the decrease in welfare occurs late in the life of the economies, when individuals are rela-
tively experienced. This means that the low output and welfare are not long-term consequences
of initial decisions taken during a learning process. Rather, they appear to re￿ ect a slow policy
response to price increases late in the sessions. Producers, as they gain experience, attempt to
increase the wedge between output and input prices. This may be because of the greater policy
uncertainty in Human Central Banker relative to Baseline, or because they come to realize that
they have a degree of market power. In the Baseline treatment, the instrumental rule responds
strongly to output price increases by raising interest rates. Thus encourages consumers to save
rather than consume, putting downward pressure on prices. Producers respond to this by low-
ering prices. The Human Central Bankers react less e⁄ectively to such price increases, and this
is re￿ ected in the greater persistence of policy shocks and price inertia relative to Baseline.
We also considered whether a number of stylized empirical facts about pricing are observed
in our economies. We ￿nd that price changes are frequent, occurring in 74:5% of possible
instances compared to 73:8% quarterly in US data. A majority of roughly 64% of price changes
are increases, compared to 64:8% in the US data. In percentage terms, price changes are also
similar to empirical estimates and the ratio of magnitudes of the average positive and negative
price change is similar. We ￿nd that the fraction of prices that change from one period to the
next is not highly correlated with in￿ ation, but the average magnitude of changes does exhibit
a correlation with in￿ ation. However, in contrast to most empirical studies, the hazard function
of price changes is upward sloping. It is possible that the di⁄erence may be due to our relatively
high in￿ ation target of 3%. The in￿ ationary environment means that prices deviate more and
more negatively from the optimum over time if not changed. This increases the gains from
reoptimization over time. Overall, the Menu Cost treatment has fewer price changes, but a
greater percentage of increases conditional on a price change, than the other treatments.
We believe that the structure used in this experiment could serve as a basis for studying the
consequences of other assumptions of DSGE models, and as a tool for policy analysis. While
we have focused here primarily on questions of monetary policy, in principle issues of ￿scal
policy could also be considered within a similar environment. The e⁄ect of market institutions
could also be analyzed, since experimental methods allow institutions to be changed, holding
all environmental variables equal. The e⁄ect of di⁄erent labor market arrangements, such
labor unions, minimum wage laws, and an asymmetry in market power, such as might arise30 C. N. Noussair, D. Pfajfar and J. Zsiros
from the use of a posted bid market institution rather than a double auction market, could be
investigated.
Our ￿ndings suggest potential avenues to extend the standard DSGE model. It is clear
that there is a role for constructing models with multiple heterogeneous agents. However, in
designing our experiment, we noticed that are certain features of standard DSGE models that
cannot be reproduced with interacting human participants. While the incentives to buy and sell
that generate underlying output demand and labor supply can be speci￿ed and controlled by
the experimenter, the e⁄ective realized demand and supply in the market are a function of the
decisions of the human participants, which may be subject to strategic or boundedly rational
behavior. Furthermore, it is impossible to control the expectations of agents in the economy
and overcome the uncertainty they have about the behavior of other agents. Finally, in the
DSGE framework, a positive level of savings is not possible. Positive savings are a feature of
most functioning economics, and our results underscore that the existence of positive savings
can in￿ uence the e⁄ects of monetary policy. We observed that monetary policy shocks induced
both income and substitution e⁄ects, dampening the e⁄ect of monetary policy. Perhaps other
channels of monetary policy, like credit channels, should be included in a standard DSGE model.
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A. Appendix
Appendix A1 lists de￿nitions for some of the aggregate variables used in the text. Appendix A2
contains the initial values of the shocks in the Low Friction treatment. Appendix A3 includes
some supplementary tables containing estimation results and descriptive statistics. Appendix
A4 is a reprint of the instructions for the Human Central Banker treatment. The instructions for
each of the other three treatments is a subset of those given here. The di⁄erences are described
in Appendix A5.
A.1. Initial value of shocks. The initial value of the At productivity shock is A0 = 3:5192:
The initial values of the preference shocks in all of the treatments except for Low Friction are
H1;t=0 = [475:0125;190:0593;165:4321]
for the ￿rst consumer,
H2;t=0 = [310:0125;464:0593;298:4321]
for the second consumer, and
H3;t=0 = [189:0125;319:0593;485:4321]
for the third consumer.
The initial values of the preference shocks in the Low Friction treatment are
H1;t=0 = [600:0125;599:0593;600:4321]
for the ￿rst consumer,
H2;t=0 = [600:0125;599:0593;600:4321]Frictions, persistence, and central bank policy in an experimental DSGE 35
for the second consumer, and
H3;t=0 = [600:0125;599:0593;600:4321]
for the third consumer.










where pjt is the price of good j at time t.





















where pjt is the price of good j at time t and yjt is the quantity of good j in period t.















jt = AjtLjt is the potential level of production of ￿rm j, Ljt is the optimal level of work
and Ajt is the average productivity shock.
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where wit is the wage of subject i at period t.
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
interest 958 5.662898 10.47261 0 50
in￿ ation 958 2.45458 13.50272 -68.55409 134.0426
gap 958 -20.22278 19.4485 -93.12498 33.0037
gdp 958 1895.601 2297.108 4.5 26002
realgdp 958 655.4251 200.3036 48 1186
rgdpg 957 2.009392 37.52016 -89.89899 923.3333
labor hired 2874 4.573069 1.847017 0 11
price 2874 48.60571 86.88744 0.1 1500
pro￿ts 2874 40.45601 176.4472 -4191.352 1270.8
prodfun 2874 15.5588 6.694012 0 41
sales 2874 14.27105 6.808245 0 39
unsold products 2874 1.287752 2.955584 0 26
wage 2854 102.0619 136.4999 0.1 4402
Wage-marketwage 2854 1.650817 94.39867 -592.1738 3994.167
markup 2845 0.2675641 0.2277611 -0.577922 0.993205
wpratio 2854 2.691143 6.496245 0.0220833 291.5232
pricedi⁄ 2826 1.111925 28.72794 -710 600
rpricedi⁄ 2826 0.0287713 0.1708514 -0.9090909 1.5
Table A1: Descriptive statistics - pooledFrictions, persistence, and central bank policy in an experimental DSGE 37
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
interest 242 8.387603 14.23122 0 50
in￿ ation 242 3.199414 21.653 -68.55409 134.0426
gap 242 -21.06752 20.26428 -93.12498 19.80921
gdp 242 1746.554 2100.203 4.5 26002
realgdp 242 626.8748 177.518 48 1012.8
rgdpg 242 4.051115 62.87422 -89.89899 923.3333
labor hired 726 4.414601 1.706865 0 9
price 726 44.53085 84.10343 0.1 1500
pro￿ts 726 62.94251 89.06482 -142.9054 707.3257
prodfun 726 14.96143 6.184845 0 38
sales 726 13.46143 6.086324 0 31
unsold products 726 1.5 3.160423 0 26
wage 722 79.61597 63.59612 0.1 511.8
Wage-marketwage 722 -0.3438827 13.17343 -127.0192 203.0308
markup 722 0.3748539 0.2600075 -0.53 0.9932051
wpratio 722 2.097963 0.8725777 0.0220833 5.7375
pricedi⁄ 714 0.2389356 47.66071 -710 600
rpricedi⁄ 714 0.0371852 0.2422498 -0.9090909 1.5
Table A2: Descriptive statistics - Baseline treatment
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
interest 225 5.881333 9.865943 0 50
in￿ ation 225 2.63949 12.08882 -32.10526 98.8399
gap 225 -26.71141 21.79813 -75.66798 16.94264
gdp 225 2431.577 3665.547 84.8 17190
realgdp 225 568.6938 222.4741 166 1062.8
rgdpg 224 1.113884 22.10198 -48.84354 81.49638
labor hired 675 4.134815 1.710819 0 10
price 675 72.29393 146.6704 4.5 1100
pro￿ts 675 71.41323 122.2867 -438.3405 1270.8
prodfun 675 14.08296 6.291079 0 39
sales 675 12.45037 6.279717 0 36
unsold products 675 1.632593 3.065284 0 23
wage 671 95.51334 104.7708 5.5 374.925
Wage-marketwage 671 -0.4317104 17.45936 -159 172.1429
markup 670 0.3754929 0.2372643 -0.577922 0.9666333
wpratio 671 2.137723 0.9887657 0.1001001 14.86667
pricedi⁄ 663 3.270588 31.11294 -300 280
rpricedi⁄ 663 0.0334799 0.1846808 -0.6382979 1.5
Table A3: Descriptive statistics - Human CB treatment38 C. N. Noussair, D. Pfajfar and J. Zsiros
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
interest 239 2.847099 6.155897 0 50
in￿ ation 239 1.795545 6.003486 -17.4482 57.41525
gap 239 -19.6395 17.74195 -79.0022 23.82888
gdp 239 1273.082 352.0875 382.1 2522.5
realgdp 239 637.9925 181.1477 153.8 1041.8
rgdpg 239 1.567379 24.91149 -76.46159 240.3121
labor hired 717 4.490934 1.90383 0 11
price 717 32.52204 13.16851 14 82
pro￿ts 717 14.72283 310.0241 -4191.352 571.7784
prodfun 717 15.23291 6.866657 0 41
sales 717 14.03487 6.651766 0 39
unsold products 717 1.198047 2.661508 0 18
wage 710 93.42234 208.1062 42.0875 4402
Wage-marketwage 710 7.49169 187.3672 -592.1738 3994.167
markup 706 0.2214447 0.1661604 -0.2387387 0.7734902
wpratio 710 3.44522 12.90085 0.9142857 291.5232
pricedi⁄ 705 0.4065248 2.686908 -17 23.1
rpricedi⁄ 705 0.0190134 0.0877353 -0.3333333 1.5
Table A4: Descriptive statistics - Menu cost treatment
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
interest 252 5.521825 9.281046 0 50
in￿ ation 252 2.199243 8.907355 -30.66667 36.19048
gap 252 -14.17133 15.80603 -68.55325 33.0037
gdp 252 2150.587 1749.849 510 7763.4
realgdp 252 776.8143 157.5383 285 1186
rgdpg 252 1.263909 23.20006 -60.20236 210.5263
labor hired 756 5.194444 1.882797 0 11
price 756 46.62262 42.42065 14 200
pro￿ts 756 15.62714 61.37043 -448.2118 188.8246
prodfun 756 17.75926 6.818769 0 39
sales 756 16.89815 7.286307 0 39
unsold products 756 0.8611111 2.864354 0 20
wage 751 137.6601 119.9132 45.125 430
Wage-marketwage 751 -0.0928188 15.1116 -129.2857 116.25
markup 751 0.1009667 0.1585665 -1.811667 0.4517544
wpratio 751 3.042976 0.5650854 1.8 9.840625
pricedi⁄ 744 0.6944892 9.121903 -70 57
rpricedi⁄ 744 0.0257473 0.1296174 -0.75 1.5
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Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
wage 2876 99.23777 130.5316 0 1520
leisure 2877 5.425791 1.38231 0 10
work 2877 4.574209 1.38231 0 10
savings 2877 39549.66 245908 0.0383689 3638128
sumsavings 959 118653.7 540950.5 525.0417 4646720
utility 2869 2741.456 1292.135 -6013.475 7054.952
cons good1 2877 4.687522 4.384988 0 32
cons good2 2877 5.014251 4.073576 0 26
cons good3 2877 4.575252 4.015571 0 25
cons (number) 2877 14.27702 7.295907 0 57
consumption 2877 631.5149 1078.006 0 24874
Table A6: Descriptive statistics - Pooled
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
wage 726 69.99287 62.84536 0 660.25
leisure 726 5.585399 1.230758 3 10
work 726 4.414601 1.230758 0 7
savings 726 69565.22 379341.9 0.0383689 3638128
sumsavings 242 208695.7 796986 543.2195 4646720
utility 726 2438.292 1161.722 -142.8506 6247.739
cons good1 726 4.097796 4.048679 0 22
cons good2 726 5 4.242641 0 26
cons good3 726 4.363636 3.552949 0 18
cons (number) 726 13.46143 7.167784 0 44
consumption 726 582.1847 1144.688 0 24874
Table A7: Descriptive statistics - Baseline treatment
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
wage 675 79.45976 115.0242 0 1200
leisure 675 5.865185 1.509973 1 10
work 675 4.134815 1.509973 0 9
savings 675 81898.04 312248.7 0.3426774 2798072
sumsavings 225 245694.1 719631.2 595.8868 4323971
utility 667 2352.707 1305.954 -6013.475 6143.891
cons good1 675 4.302222 4.013765 0 21
cons good2 675 4.325926 3.411513 0 21
cons good3 675 3.822222 4.124665 0 21
cons (number) 675 12.45037 6.915459 0 46
consumption 675 810.5256 1684.545 0 12160
Table A8: Descriptive statistics - Human CB treatment40 C. N. Noussair, D. Pfajfar and J. Zsiros
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
wage 720 73.29934 75.34377 0 1132.25
leisure 720 5.504167 1.182856 1 10
work 720 4.495833 1.182856 0 9
savings 720 2605.616 2875.418 0.4359367 13970.76
sumsavings 240 7835.598 6594.705 525.0417 26677.59
utility 720 2513.825 1063.925 -4752.119 6753.636
cons good1 720 4.183333 4.062071 0 28
cons good2 720 5.826389 3.986643 0 23
cons good3 720 4.05 3.255935 0 16
cons (number) 720 14.05972 6.029417 0 37
consumption 720 423.8192 182.6202 0 1576.9
Table A9: Descriptive statistics - Menu cost treatment
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
wage 755 169.7777 192.6954 0 1520
leisure 756 4.805556 1.366785 0 10
work 756 5.194444 1.366785 0 10
savings 756 8098.946 18932.72 2.232203 146401.8
sumsavings 252 24296.84 42794.93 2994.799 260551.8
utility 756 3592.364 1211.448 649.9122 7054.952
cons good1 756 6.078042 4.976288 0 32
cons good2 756 4.869048 4.396271 0 22
cons good3 756 5.951058 4.616296 0 25
cons (number) 756 16.89815 8.097678 1 57
consumption 756 716.8622 723.9243 17.2 5311
Table A10: Descriptive statistics - Low friction treatmentFrictions, persistence, and central bank policy in an experimental DSGE 41
Hazard Pooled Baseline Human CB Menu cost Low friction
ratio b/se b/se b/se b/se b/se
L.price 1.0000 1.0014*** 0.9992* 1.0234** 0.9982
(0.0004) (0.0005) (0.0005) (0.0109) (0.0043)
wage 1.0007* 0.9981** 1.0013 0.9796*** 1.0023
(0.0004) (0.0009) (0.0009) (0.0062) (0.0015)
Stock 1.0262* 0.9684 0.9632 1.1983*** 1.0226
(0.0154) (0.0289) (0.0290) (0.0521) (0.0249)
prod 0.9311 1.3261** 0.8368 0.5055*** 0.9904
(0.0616) (0.1497) (0.1113) (0.1074) (0.1355)
lgap 1.0000 1.0040 1.0002 0.9994 1.0020
(0.0015) (0.0025) (0.0029) (0.0050) (0.0035)
L.realinterest 0.9986 0.9990 0.9921** 1.0024 0.9991
(0.0016) (0.0023) (0.0032) (0.0087) (0.0033)
L.prodmsales 0.9777** 0.9516** 0.9875 0.9374** 0.9745
(0.0112) (0.0188) (0.0238) (0.0300) (0.0343)
L.pro￿ts 1.0008** 0.9996 1.0011** 0.9994 0.9994
(0.0004) (0.0007) (0.0005) (0.0018) (0.0019)
Dppro￿t 0.6807*** 0.6219*** 0.7798 0.6565** 0.7041
(0.0639) (0.1028) (0.1491) (0.1379) (0.1521)
p 2.3518*** 2.6535*** 2.5452*** 1.5581*** 2.7462***
(0.0361) (0.0706) (0.0720) (0.0648) (0.0717)
N 2029 599 543 272 615
￿2 29 23 17 43 22
BIC 2713.9 622.3 643.3 669.5 619.1
*p<.10, **p<.05, ***p<.01
Table A11: Parametric hazard rate regressions42 C. N. Noussair, D. Pfajfar and J. Zsiros
dur Freq. Percent Cum.
1 1738 82.6 82.6
2 230 10.93 93.54
3 71 3.37 96.91
4 25 1.19 98.1
5 13 0.62 98.72
6 9 0.43 99.14
7 5 0.24 99.38
8 3 0.14 99.52
9 3 0.14 99.67
10 3 0.14 99.81
11 1 0.05 99.86
12 1 0.05 99.9
19 1 0.05 99.95
21 1 0.05 100
Total 2104 100
Table A12: Price spells
in￿ ation All Baseline Human CB Menu Cost Low friction
frac 0.1043 0.0463 0.1751 0.2672 0.1434
size 0.5348 0.5522 0.4768 0.8489 0.7987
Table A13: Correlation of size and fraction with in￿ ation
# of periods (sig.)
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Table A14: Persistence of shocks
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Figure A1: Hazard rate of price changes for Menu cost treatment
A.4. Instructions. This section contains the instructions of the experiment. Each subject
received the same instructions during the experiment. The instructions reprinted here were
used in the Human Central Banker treatment.
OVERVIEW. You are about to participate in an experiment in the economics of market
decision making. The instructions are simple and if you follow them carefully and make good
decisions, you can earn a considerable amount of money which will be paid to you in cash at
the end of the experiment. Trading in the experiment will be in terms of experimental currency
units (ECU). You will be paid, in Euro, at the end of the experiment.
The experiment will consist of a series of at least 50 periods. You are a consumer, a producer,
or a central banker, and will remain in the same role for the entire experiment. If you are a
consumer, you can make money by selling labor and buying products. If you are a producer,
you can make money by buying labor and selling products that you make with the labor. If
you are a banker you can make money by trying to get the in￿ ation rate as close to possible to
a target level. Whether you are a consumer, a producer, or a central banker is indicated at the
top of the instructions.
SPECIFIC INSTRUCTIONS FOR CONSUMERS.
Selling labor. At the beginning of each period, you will have the opportunity to sell your
labor for ECU. You will see the screen shown on the next page.
You can sell units of Labor for whatever wage you are able to get for them. To sell a unit,
you use the table in the middle of the upper part of your screen entitled ￿Labor market￿ . There
are two ways to sell a unit:
1. You can accept an o⁄er to buy labor that a producer has made: To do this, look in the
column labeled ￿o⁄ers to buy￿ , and highlight the wage at which you would like to sell.
Then click on the red button labeled ￿sell￿ .44 C. N. Noussair, D. Pfajfar and J. Zsiros
2. You can make an o⁄er to sell, and wait for a producer to accept it. To do so, enter a
wage in the ￿eld labeled ￿Your o⁄er￿ , and then select ￿O⁄er to sell￿to submit it to the
market. Your o⁄er will then appear in the column labeled ￿O⁄ers to sell￿ . It may then be
accepted by a producer. However, it is also possible that it may not be accepted by any
producers before the current period ends, since they are free to choose whether or not to
accept an o⁄er.
When you do not wish to sell any more units in the period, please click the ￿Stop Selling￿
key.
You must pay a cost, in Euro, for each unit you sell. The table in the upper left part of
the screen, called ￿Your cost to sell labor￿tells you how much you have to pay for each unit
of labor you can sell. The numbers are given in units of 1/100th of a cent, so that a cost of
400, for example, is equal to 4 cents. Each row of the table corresponds to a unit that you are
selling. The ￿rst row is for the ￿rst unit you sell in the current period, the second row is for
the second unit, etc... The second column of the table tells you how much it costs you to sell
each unit. The numbers in the table will decrease by 1% from one period to the next.
Buying products. After selling labor in each period, you will have the opportunity to
buy products by spending ECU. The screen on the next page will appear to allow you to do so.
In the upper left part of the screen, there is a table which will help you make your purchase
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The row called ￿price￿gives the current price per unit, in ECU, that the producer making the
unit is currently charging for it.
The next row gives the ￿Next unit￿ s value per ECU￿ . This calculated in the following way.
Your value for the next unit is the amount of money, in Euro, that you receive for the next
unit you buy. As you buy more units within a period, your value for the next unit you buy will
always be less than for the last unit you bought of the same good. Your values will change from
one period to the next. They will randomly increase and decrease from one period to the next,
but on average, they will decrease by 1% per period.
The numbers in the ￿Next unit￿ s value per ECU￿row give the value for the unit, divided
by the price that the producer selling the unit is charging. The last row in the table shows the
number of units of each good that you have purchased so far in the current period.
To make a purchase of a unit of good 1, click on the button labeled ￿buy a unit of good 1￿ .
To make a purchase of a unit of good 2 or 3, click on the button corresponding to the good you
want to buy. When you do not want to purchase any more units of any of the three goods, click
the button labeled ￿Quit buying￿ .
Saving money for later periods. Any ECU that you have not spent in the period is
kept by you for the next period. It will earn interest at the rate shown on at the top of your
screen next to the label ￿Savings interest rate￿ . That means, for example, if the interest rate is
2%, and you have 100 ECU at the end of the period, it will grow to 102 ECU by the beginning46 C. N. Noussair, D. Pfajfar and J. Zsiros
of the next period.
Note that saving ECU for later periods involves a trade-o⁄. If you buy more products now,
and save less ECU, you can earn more, in Euro, in the current period, but you have less ECU
spend in later periods. If you buy fewer products now, you make fewer Euro in the current
period, but you have more ECU to spend in later periods and can earn more Euro then. In a
given period, you cannot spend more ECU than you have at that time.
Your share of producer pro￿ts. You will also receive an additional payment of ECU at
the end of each period. This payment is based on the total pro￿t of producers. Each consumer
will receive an amount of ECU equal to 1/3 of the total pro￿t of all three producers. How the
pro￿t of producers is determined will be described in the next section. You might think of this
as you owning a share in each of the producers so that you receive a share of their pro￿ts.
How you make money if you are a consumer. Your earnings in a period, in Euro,
are equal to the valuations of all of the products you have purchased minus the unit cost of all
of the units of labor that you sell.
For example, suppose that in period 5 you buy two units of good 1 and one unit of good 3.
You also sell three units of labor in the period. Your valuation, that is, the amount of Euros
you receive, for your ￿rst unit of good 1 is 400, and your valuation for the second unit of good
1 is 280. Your value of the ￿rst unit of good 3 is 350. These valuations can be found on your
￿Buy Products￿screen in the row called ￿Your valuation for the next unit. The cost of your
￿rst, second and third units of labor are 50, 100, and 150. Then, you earnings for the period￿
equal
400 + 280 + 350 ￿50 ￿100 ￿150 = 730 = 7.3 cents
Note that the ECU that you paid to buy products and those that you received from selling
labor are not counted in your earnings. The ECU you receive from selling labor, saving, and
producer pro￿t is important, however, because that is the only money that you can use to buy
products.
Your Euro earnings for the experiment are equal to your total earnings in all of the periods,
plus a bonus at the end of the game that is described in section 6.
SPECIFIC INSTRUCTIONS FOR PRODUCERS.
Buying labor. At the beginning of each period, you will have the opportunity to buy
labor with ECU. You will see the following screen.
You can buy units of Labor for whatever wage in ECU you are able to get them for. To
buy a unit, you use the table in the middle of the upper part of your screen entitled ￿Labor
market￿ . There are two ways to buy:
1. Accept an o⁄er to sell that a consumer has made: To do this, look in the column labeled
￿o⁄ers to sell￿ , and highlight the price at which you would like to buy. Then click on the
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2. Make an o⁄er to buy, and wait for a potential seller to accept it. To do so, enter a wage
in the ￿eld labeled ￿Your o⁄er￿ , and then select ￿Make a new o⁄er￿to submit it to the
market. Your o⁄er will then appear in the column labeled ￿O⁄ers to buy￿ . It may then
be accepted by a seller. However, it is also possible that it may not be accepted by any
sellers before the current period ends.
The table in the upper left of the screen, entitled ￿You require￿can help you make your
purchase decisions. In the ￿rst column is the number of the unit that you are purchasing. 1st
corresponds to the ￿rst unit you buy in the period, 2nd corresponds to the second unit you are
buying in the period, etc... The second column, indicates how many units of product that is
produced with each unit of labor. In the example here, each unit of labor produces 3.4 units of
product.
Selling products. After the market for labor closes, you automatically produce one of
the three goods using all of the labor you have purchased in the period. You produce good
........ and you will always be the only producer of that good. You can make money by selling
the good for ECU. You can do so by using the following screen.
In the upper middle portion of the screen, the number of units of Labor you have purchased
in the period is shown in the ￿eld labeled ￿ Number of Units of Labor Purchased￿ . Just below48 C. N. Noussair, D. Pfajfar and J. Zsiros
that ￿eld is the amount of the product you produce that the labor you bought has made. The
amount of product that you make with a given amount of labor can change from period to
period. ·Labor expense · indicates how much money you spent on labor in the period.
In the ￿eld labeled ￿Insert your price￿ , you can type in the price per unit, in ECU, that
you wish to charge for each unit of the product you have produced. When you have decided
which price to charge and typed it in, click on the ￿eld called ￿ set price￿ . This price will then
be displayed to consumers who have an opportunity to purchase from you.
How you make money as a producer. If the amount of ECU you receive from sales is
more than the amount that you spent on labor, you will earn a pro￿t.
Your pro￿t in ECU in a period = Total ECU you get from sales of product ￿total ECU you
pay for labor
In period 1, your pro￿t in ECU will be converted to Euro at a rate of ...... ECU = 1 Euro.
Therefore:
Your earnings in Euro in period 1 = .....*[ ECU you get from sales of product ￿ECU you
pay for labor]
In later periods, the conversion rate of your earnings from ECU to Euro will be adjusted for
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Your ECU balance will be set to zero in each period. However, the pro￿t you have earned
in each period, in Euro, will be yours to keep, and the computer will keep track of how much
you have earned in previous periods. Your Euro earnings for the experiment are equal to your
total earnings in all of the periods.
SPECIFIC INSTRUCTIONS FOR CENTRAL BANKERS.
Setting the interest rate. Three of you are in the role of Central bankers. In each
period, the three of you will set the interest rate that consumers will earn on their savings in
the current period. You will see the screen shown on the next page at the beginning of each
period.
In the ￿eld labeled ￿Interest Rate Decision￿ , you enter the interest rate that you would like
to set for the period. Of the three of you who set interest rates, the second highest (that is, the
median choice) will be the one in e⁄ect in the period.
Higher interest rates might encourage consumers to save rather than spend their money and
might lead to lower prices, and therefore a lower rate of in￿ ation. On the other hand, lower
interest rates might discourage saving, and lead to more spending and higher prices.
How you make money as a central banker. You earnings in each period will depend
on the in￿ ation rate in the current period. The in￿ ation rate for a period is calculated in the
following way. The average price for the three products is calculated for this period and last
period. The percentage that the prices went up or down is determined. This percentage is the
in￿ ation rate.
For example if the prices of the three products are 60, 65 and 70 in period 9, the average
price in period 9 is 65. If the average prices in period 8 were 55, 55, and 70, the average price
in period 8 was 60. Prices increased by (65 ￿60)/60 = .0833 = 8.33% in period 9. Notice that
prices could either increase or decrease in each period.
You make more money the closer the in￿ ation rate is to .....% in each period.
Speci￿cally you earnings in Euro will be equal to ...... - (Actual In￿ ation Rate - .....%)2
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ADDITIONAL INFORMATION DISPLAYED ON YOUR SCREENS. There
are graphs on each of the screens described above that give you some additional information
about market conditions. You are free to use this information if you choose, to help you make
your decisions. In all of the graphs, the horizontal axis is the period number.
Consumers. If you are a consumer, the graphs show for each period, histories of:
￿ the interest rate (that you earn on the ECU you save),
￿ the in￿ ation rate (the percentage that average prices for the three goods have gone up or
down between one period and the next),
￿ the output gap (a measure of the di⁄erence between the most products that could be
made and how much are actually made; the smaller the gap, the lower is production) ,
￿ the wage you received (for the labor you sold),
￿ the average wage in the economy (the average amount consumers received for selling
labor),
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￿ your consumption (how much money that you spent on products)
￿ your savings (how much of your money that you didn ·t spend on products),
￿ the price of each of the three products
￿ the quantity you bought of each of the three products
Producers. If you are a producer, the graphs show histories of:
￿ the interest rate,
￿ the in￿ ation rate,
￿ the output gap,
￿ the wage you paid (for the labor you bought),
￿ the average wage in the economy,
￿ the number of units of labor you bought,
￿ your labor expense (how much you spent on labor),
￿ your production (how much you have produced),
￿ your sales (how much you have sold),
￿ your pro￿ts
Central Bankers. If you are a central banker, the graphs show histories of:
￿ Interest rates,
￿ Your earnings,
￿ The GDP, a measure of how much the economy is producing
￿ The output gap.
ENDING THE EXPERIMENT. The experiment will continue for at least 50 periods.
You will not know in advance in which period the experiment will end. At the end of the
experiment, any consumer who has ECU will have it converted automatically to Euro and paid
to him/her.
If you are a consumer, we will convert your ECU to Euro in the following manner. We will
imagine that the experiment would continue forever, with your valuations and costs following
the downward trend they had during the experiment. We will then calculate how much you
would earn if you made the best possible savings, labor selling, and product buying decisions
that are possible, given the savings you currently have. We will use the average prices for labor
and products during the experiment to make the calculation. We will then take the resulting
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STARTING THE EXPERIMENT. In the ￿rst two periods of the experiment, we will
place limits on the range of wages and prices that can be o⁄ered. You will be informed of these
limits when the experiment begins. These restrictions will be lifted in period three.
A.5. Di⁄erences with the instructions in other treatments. In the Baseline and Low
Friction treatments, subject received the same instructions as those in Appendix A4, except
for Section 4 entitled Speci￿c Instructions for Central Bankers. That part was not included in
Baseline and Low Friction, because the interest rate was set automatically by the computer.
In the Menu Cost treatment, section 4 was absent, similarly to the Baseline and Menu Cost
treatments. In Menu Cost only, the screen-shot in the ￿gure above was displayed in Section
3.b, entitled Selling products, instead of the one shown in Appendix A4. The screen shown in
the Menu Cost treatment was accompanied by the following text:
After the market for labor closes, you automatically produce one of the three goods using
all of the labor you have purchased in the period. You produce good .... and you will always
be the only producer of that good. You can make money by selling the good for ECU. You can
do so by using the following screen.
In the upper middle portion of the screen, the number of units of Labor you have purchased
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that ￿eld is the amount of the product you produce that the labor you bought has made. The
amount of product that you make with a given amount of labor can change from period to
period. ￿ Labor expense￿indicates how much money you spent on labor in the period.
In the ￿eld labeled ￿Insert your price￿ , you can type in the price per unit, in ECU, that
you wish to charge for each unit of the product you have produced. When you have decided
which price to charge and typed it in, click on the ￿eld called ￿ set price￿ . This price will then be
displayed to consumers who have an opportunity to purchase from you. You can change your
price from one period to the next or you can keep it the same as in the last period. However, if
you change the price you are charging for your product, you have to pay a cost that is calculated
in the following way.
Cost to change price = (price you charged last period)*(how many units you have produced
this period)*0.025.